Regulating slavery: why the regulationist approach is morally and intellectually backwards even if personal adoption is the right thing to do

It is an ad hominem that is one part common and one part simple-minded to suggest that abolitionists want to leave nonhuman animals in the worst possible conditions in order to make their case. I have read it several times over the years in various, equally boring and misguided expressions. But it is often the way of those who cannot address arguments correctly and substantively to engage in misrepresentations and 'faux' analyses predicated on creative semantics and concocted straw. One thing about straw, though, it almost always involves a fair amount of shit, even if the percentage varies. The most obvious example of why this claim is ridiculous lies in the promotion of abolition itself; and second, in the promotion of personal adoption by many abolitionists.

In short, though, because we may be able to improve successfully the well-being of individual animals privately with adoption, it does not follow from this that we should waste time and effort trying to improve the well-being of nonhuman animals with campaigns that are 1) unlikely to succeed, 2) if they do succeed, are unlikely to ever come into effect, 3) if they do come into effect, will be skirted, 4) if they are not skirted, would still not result in promoting veganism or abolition and instead may confuse people about the moral necessity of both, and 5) still would not help nonhuman animals in serious ways. For example, let's say a campaign proposes an extra quarter inch of cage space. It may not pass, it may never come into effect, it may be skirted, and even if all of that does not come to pass, all it yields is an extra quarter inch of cage space and may further confuse people about the moral need to go vegan and to stop using animals. Anyone who would consider that campaign meaningful to the well-being of a nonhuman animal doesn't know much about nonhuman animals.

Similarly, to hide Anne Frank from the Nazis in a cupboard makes sense. To engage in a campaign to compel the Nazis to pack fewer people into each cattle car to Auschwitz or to add a little violin music for the ride would be a very, very deeply misguided use of time; anyone who would claim that the latter is a seriously expression of human rights activism would seriously fail to comprehend what is at stake.

Of course, there are many good reasons for abolitionist advocates not to propose, not to endorse, and not to devote time and resources to campaigns that propose to regulate the use of nonhuman animals rather than abolishing that use. Analogically, these campaigns are the moral equivalent to asking rapists to wear condoms and murderer�s to use a sharper knife since these may reduce the gross amount of suffering rape and murder cause. In that sense, they are deeply morally problematic. Moreover, even a basic understanding of political economy helps us to determine that these campaign would never achieve much for nonhuman animals. They would still remain in slavery. As Francione argues in Rain Without Thunder and elsewhere, many reforms improve efficiencies (and therefore, profits) of agribusiness and helps the industry continue. Moreover, because a regulation may harm a smaller producer, it does not follow that this will harm the industry or that, indeed, it would not help a larger producer, and so on. Regardless, it does not follow from any of this that advocates should not adopt or should not promote personal adoption as a way to improve the well-being of nonhuman animals in the here and now.

An abolitionist refuses campaigns to regulate animal use for the same reason that feminists refuse campaigns that propose to regulate gang rape by encouraging rapists to wear condoms: because it is morally wrong, intellectually wrong and a waste of resources. It would not follow from this that feminists are in favor of gang rape or that they would want it continue in order to make their case. To suggest as much would be misguided -- indeed, suggestive of a moral and intellectual ineptitude that borders on clownish (no offense to actual clowns). Moreover, the painful emotional appeals dotted by melodramatic rhetorical questions (often pleas for attention) that tend to saturate these kinds of claims only evince the naivet�, the ignorance, and as a general matter, the thoughtless of the questioner. These reflect a rhetorical flourish that veils thinly an attempt to shut down critical discourse through shaming.

Sadly, the regulationist movement hierarchy is populated by bobble-headed mouthpieces who have decided to cash in the slavery of nonhuman animals long enough to shout and bluster that abolitionists are doing something wrong by doing what is best for nonhuman animals. The sycophants of the movement have created a winning business model; it combines the ingratiation of their own sadly deformed emotional needs, by turns confused, angry, oafish, and abusive towards other advocates with confusing a nonvegan public with its mutually exclusive hopes both to do right and to keep eating nonhuman animals products.

Of course, that�s entirely shameful, but still, it is not often clear why abolitionists support one type of activity related to the well-being of a nonhuman animal (personal adoption) and another type of activity, nominally related to the well-being of a nonhuman animal (welfare reform). This article will clarify some of this issues. Let�s address the rather pathetically anaemic complaint that abolitionists want animals to remain in poor conditions. That this is contrafactual is evidenced in a number of ways.

First, to promote abolition, rather than regulation, proposes to end outright the conditions in which animals are held as slaves. Whether they are tortured, or humanely murdered does not matter to the abolitionist insofar as abolitionists believe that animal use is wrong as a moral matter regardless of the treatment involved. Instead, welfare advocacy focuses almost entirely on saying: �we should change these horrible conditions!� without addressing the root of that condition in substantive ways (through abolitionist vegan outreach). It seems only reasonable to suggest that someone who wants to alleviate the suffering of animals but does not advocate and work toward an immediate end to their slavery (as the root of that suffering) is either very misguided, is selling something, or both.

Second, were this not the case, any abolitionist who promotes the personal adoption of nonhuman animals obviously concerns him or herself with the well-being of at least the animals they personally adopt or the animals whose adoption they promote. Regulationist advocacy, in contrast, often expresses itself ambivalently toward animal adoption, with some groups promoting it as a part of their fundraising, some groups (like PeTA) collecting and killing animals (17,000 since 1998 according to Newsweek), and some groups simply shrugging it off as an activity that is not worthwhile. The motivations for these positions varies, but certainly, no proper abolitionist is ambivalent about the morally pressing need for personal animal adoption.

But what makes personal adoption helpful and working on welfare unhelpful from an abolitionist standpoint? Sometimes, confused advocates do not understand why abolitionists promote personal adoption but not regulated animal use when both claim to improve the well-being of animals. It is not because abolitionists are opposed to well-being. It�s because, as Francione argues, promoting the regulated use of nonhuman animals is, at best, a zero sum game. This is not the case with personal adoption for several reasons.

First, addressing the well-being of a nonhuman animal through personal adoption is not as constrained by their property status as legal reforms are. I can adopt an individual nonhuman animal and treat him or her as a person in my home, and foster his or her well-being accordingly. Regulationist advocacy typically proposes nothing serious to help nonhuman animals, is constrained by the legal property status of nonhuman animals. Regulationist reforms often amount to fussing with the wallpaper rather than to addressing the walls of animal slavery.

Second, adopting nonhuman animals is very unlikely to confuse anyone about whether or not adoption affirms the view that animals are our property, any more than pushing a 2 year old child out of the way of an oncoming car is likely to suggest that pushing 2 year old children as a general matter is morally acceptable. Space aliens perhaps could not figure out the difference, but most people understand that adoption is an act taken with the intent of benefiting the well-being of the adoptee. Moreover, even if this were not the case, we may still have a duty to individual animals, and we should put what we owe others ahead of what others may imagine in response; there is no similar moral duty to promote animal use as morally acceptable the way that regulationist campaigns do.

Third, personal adoption does not incipiently pose the nonhuman animals adopted as instruments for human use the way regulationist campaigning often does. Regulationist campaigns frequently promote welfare measures as harmful to agribusiness. This suggests strongly that nonhuman animals are merely economic units whose well-being can be turned into an economic expense for agribusinesses. It is often unclear whether regulationists would prefer to hurt agribusinesses more or help nonhuman animals more. Regardless, this kind of authoritarian and self-serving calculation often reflects serious confusion about what we other other animals. Suffice it to say, abolitionists do not promote personal adoption out of a sense of �movement gain� the way that many regulationist advocacy groups promote legal reforms. If we take nonhuman animals seriously, then obviously, we should not regard them as our instruments in any regard, even as props for our political theater to help us move the movement forward.

Finally, personal adoption is often the right thing to do for an individual animal should we wish to act in a way that is most in accord with their rights. To be clear, adoption is not an absolute moral requirement to be an abolitionist or even to be vegan. But it does not follow from this that abolitionists and vegans should not adopt nonhuman animals.

As an abolitionist vegan, for example, I consider many of my decisions from a comprehensive moral standpoint. I use all the tools at my disposal to make the best decision. For example, I do not use nonhuman animals for food, clothing and entertainment because they have the moral right not to be used. But I also do my best not to harm spiders accidentally because I believe it is virtuous to act beyond the moral baseline that the rights of others calls me to observed, if the opportunity for them to do so is there to do so. Finally, I avoid contributing financially to agribusinesses with my purchasing power to avoid the consequence of enriching these businesses and to avoid leaving others with the impression that we can buy our way to social transformation.

Of course, it is important to understand that our duty to respect the rights of nonhuman animals is what is most important. Nevertheless, when we consider what it is to do what is good for an individual animal (human and non), it is unwise to confuse the moral baseline with all of what we might do, just as it reflects a kind of moral and intellectual sickliness to propose that we can marry our interests with those we choose to exploit through the act of exploitation. Still, what we owe another rights-holder is certainly the most important point, and the point that should guide our thinking primarily, but it is a moral baseline.

As advocates for other animals, it is best to ensure that how we organize our political work for nonhuman animals as an aggregate of rights-holders, complements our political work for nonhuman animals as individual rights-holders. The maximal way to take the rights of individual animals seriously and the rights of animals as an aggregate of individuals seriously is with vegan outreach, abolitionist education and personal adoption. In contrast, regulationist advocacy achieves nothing substantive for nonhuman animals either as an aggregate or as individuals, even if it may temporarily medicate the self-esteem of advocates.

So long as nonhuman animals are property, even the well-being of individual companions are under threat; pit bull bans being the most obvious example. And so, abolitionists promote legal and moral personhood and an end to property status even for companion animals who may already be well-cared for. It would be a bad inference, ignorance or simple misrepresentation to suggest that it is the abolitionist position that we wish to leave nonhuman animals in any kind of slavery or that it is necessary to our position.

To learn more about why those who advocate abolition rather than regulation, and why regulation is completely inimical to abolition, these articles may also be helpful.

The problem with happy meat:
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/happy-meat-making-humans-feel-better-about-eating-animals/

Why welfare reform is not a viable approach if we take animal well-being seriously:
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/the-four-problems-of-animal-welfare-in-a-nutshell/

Why vegetarianism is morally problematic:
http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/commentary-aspects-of-the-vegetarianvegan-debate/

There are, of course, some moral complexities to personal adoption, but because there are rational questions, it does not follow that there are no rational answers. If we wish take nonhuman animals seriously, as Francione argues, the most important thing any of us can do is go vegan. If you are not vegan today, you should go vegan today. If you want to learn more about abolition, visit www.abolitionistapproach.com to learn more about the approach.