I understand that you granted Dr. Jean Kazez a PhD in 1991. I realize that you cannot be responsible for what happens to your students after they graduate: whether they do well, or do ill, whether they improve or whether they lose intellectual ground the way a popped balloon loses air. University of Arizona, I'm not blaming you. I know it's tough to graduate students these days and ensure that they understand what it is that they profess. For all I know, University of Arizona, Dr. Kazez may have lashed out at you unprovoked the way she did at Gary Francione. If that's the case, you have my sympathies.
I just have trouble believing that Jean Kazez seems to have worsened so tremendously since graduation that she doesn't understand basic reasoning, doesn't understand the difference between the major moral frameworks and doesn't understand the difference between rhetorical posturing and substantive argument. I imagine it happens. Someone who seems to idolize slaughterhouse designers like Temple Grandin seems to me to be very misguided on a number of matters. But on the very off chance that you are just giving away PhDs in philosophy to anyone who asks, I would like one. I am not judging. I am not claiming you are, I am just saying that if you are, I would also like one, please.
Before you say no, please, let me make my case:
1a) It seems clear that Dr. Kazez' reasoning skills are as shaky as my buttocks would be if I were performing in a hip-hop video. First, it's not clear that she understands basic historical fallacies. I still do not know what Dr. Kazez' actual position is (analogies don't always tell us exactly what's being argued), but historical analogies are often fraught with opportunities for error.
For example, reasoning that because W did X in the past (the amelioration of the conditions of human slavery) that Y should do Z today because it seems analogically similar does not follow of necessity. It may follow. It may be good. It may be right. The point is, we have to form an argument to establish that. As I argued in a previous post, for example, it does not follow that because W did X 150 years ago to solve one type of social justice problem then Y should do Z 150 years later to solve another, potentially very different social justice problem. In short, whether or not anyone attempted to ameliorate the awful conditions of human slavery in nineteenth century American South, it does not, of necessity, follow that campaigns to regulate animal use that continue nonhuman animal slavery are a good, useful or right thing to do today.
The reasoning here would be problematic on multiple levels. It does not follow that what W did resulted in X. It does not follow that, even if what W did did result in X, that W was doing something that yielded positive consequences at the time. Nor does it follow that if the consequences were positive, that W was doing something right. It does not even follow that if W and Y are in the same social justice movement (e.g., class struggle) that the what was justifiable 150 years ago makes much sense today. All of these claims needs to be established with a substantive argument, not just rhetorical questions and pseudo-historical analyses that we pull from out of our asses.
For example, let's say I claim Frederick Douglass gave a simply amazing speech and then the Civil War happened. It would not follow that, if I gave an amazing speech today, it would result in a new Civil War. That is, historically contiguous events do not necessary have a causal nature. Further, it would not necessarily follow that it was right for Frederick Douglass to have given that speech. It would also not necessarily follow that it achieved positive consequences, and so on. But even if it were right for him to do so at the time, it would not necessarily follow analogically that I would be right to do the same today. The work of history is in elaborating these arguments in a way that is reasonably sound and well-evidenced. The work of moral, political and sociological theory is to guide us today in light of what happened historically -- if history provides us with meaningful guidance.
In short, there are multiple opportunities for misguided thinking when we attempt to string any (let alone all) of these kinds of assumptions together in a single analogy. When we mobilize historical analogies, it should be to clarify a rational argument, not draw a sloppy and misguided comparison that occludes the need for justification. Now, let's go back and assume that Douglass didn't really give the speech that I claimed he did, and yet I continue to insist my argument follows analogically. It is only a statement of the obvious to say that my argument would be unfounded.
This kind of argumentation would reflect a deeply misguided understanding of history in general, a lack of knowledge with regard to the specifics of the history of slavery in the Southern United States, as well as how to reason with respect to both. Francione's work, in contrast, relies on contemporary historical data, sound moral theory, a sound understanding of political economy and sociology, as well as analogies to make his claims. Although I am no expert, this seems to be a good way to form moral judgements to me.
1b) Related: analogical reasoning is one of the weaker types of argumentation. Most of Dr. Kazez' argument to defend amelioration (improving the conditions of slaves in the short run) seems predicated on an analogy (which has already seems to be poorly reasoned and historically inaccurate). Leaving aside the specific problems with how Dr. Kazez may be reasoning with respect to this analogy, surely the University of Arizona only graduates students who know that there are a plethora of other ways to argue outside of analogy?
I wonder how someone completes a PhD in philosophy only to turn around and make an argument about the life, death and well-being of another sentient person and pin it on what looks to be flawed reasoning about a flawed and historically problematic analogy. I suppose it is what it is, but it is still disappointing. To be clear, I'm not claiming that Dr. Kazez can't reason. I don't know for sure one way or another based on the evidence so far. It would be a bad inference to assume that Dr. Kazez can't reason just because she's not reasoning well in this case (like, if I may be permitted an apt analogy, assuming that all swans are black because all of the swans I've seen so far are black). But if she can reason effectively, I wonder why she doesn't seem to be trying very hard.
2a) It's not clear that Dr. Kazez takes philsophy very seriously.
In her blog, she writes:
A fairly offhand remark I made about Gary Francione in the comments to my last post apparently caused offense, so I need to expand, explain, etc, especially because Gary tells me he plans on using me as a poster child for the �welfarist� (i.e. utilitarian) stance in a planned podcast. My forthcoming book is actually steadfastly non-utilitarian, so this doesn�t make much sense.First, what Dr. Kazez should do is just apologize and reread Francione's work. That's pretty simple. She got Francione's position wrong. She got "reasoning" wrong. She got the history of the slave trade wrong. Then she got "philosophy" wrong. She lashed out at Francione (by her own admission) because another commenter, in an effort to be helpful, posted some comments to her blog, citing Francione to source his argument. In that sense, she got her duties as a professional wrong and typical human etiquette wrong. But spinning it as an off-hand remark gets things even more wrong, in the same way that suggesting Glenn Beck's accusation that Obama hates white people were just off-hand remarks would get a great deal wrong.
In good faith, though, let's take that claim seriously, that this remark was, indeed, off-hand. The reasonable implication to this kind of statement is that she considers her professional responsibility not to misrepresent the positions of other thinkers to be relatively unimportant, her basic human responsibility not to lash out at others unprovoked to be relatively unimportant, animal slavery to be relatively unimportant and even the ideas she herself expresses to be relatively unimportant. All of this is a shame, of course, but I think Dr. Kazez may be onto something with the last point.
The confusion here is reality TV-esque. I am not making light of anyone's emotional and intellectual fragility when I say that, given the amount of plagiarism and groupthink in the animal welfare advocacy community, I think it was only responsible for another advocate to cite Francione if he was discussing Francione's ideas. I don't know why that would be a source of Internet rage. But turning back to point, it seems very unclear from her statement whether Dr. Kazez understands Francione's argument with respect to new welfarism or she doesn't understand utilitarianism or she doesn't understand both. She does claim to teach Francione's work, but that doesn't make me feel any better because:
2b) It's also not clear that she understands the differences between moral frameworks (and it's still not clear whether she understands what "wants" means). David Tong touches on this a bit in his piece here and I want to expand on what he has written:
Why is Dr. Kazez's misunderstanding of the relationship between welfare and utilitarian positions problematic? First, anyone can take a new welfare position without being a utilitarian. In fact, many new welfarists claim to be in favor of the rights of animals but working on addressing their well-being in the short term. Some welfarists also take the position that it is fine to continue using nonhuman animals (and violating their rights) because nonhuman animals do not have an interest in continuing their lives, and so, do not have a moral right to have that interest protected. Both positions are possible without taking a utilitarian view. In some sense, insofar as new welfarists claim to take animal rights seriously, it's likely that they're taking a position at least partly informed by deontology (or at least rule utility, even if they are confused about what actions the rights of others call us to take).
Further, utility is just one consequentialist position within a broader continuum of positions, and even within utility there are multiple strands that propose that we should form moral judgements using different formulas -- as I understand it; I am the first to admit that I am not a philosopher. But the idea that new welfarism is somehow synonymous with utilitarianism reflects a lack of understanding around these words and the ideas they reflect.
To be a new welfarist who takes animal well-being seriously because of a utilitarian view may be a common position, but it is not required that anyone take all three positions together. To lump these positions together as mutually required involves a kind of reasoning that is also problematic. It is like reasoning backwards to the conclusion that, if I want to make voters happy by lowering taxes, I must be a Republican. Of course, there are probably plenty of Republicans who would agree that lowering taxes and making voters happy are good and related. But it does not follow from this that I have to be a Republican to "want" to lower taxes, or that I have to "want" to make voters happy, or that I necessarily want to either lower taxes or make voters happy if I identify as a Republican. And so on.
In short, it is a mistake to conflate positions that, although they may be commonly related in practice, are not mutually required. Being a utilitarian and a new welfarist are not synonymous. I can understand why the polysyllabic richesse involved might confuse someone, but taking our time to sort through ideas helps. In general, I have no doubt that many new welfarists (who argue that we are simultaneously working toward abolition animal use while we work toward regulating animal use) are confused about what they owe nonhuman animals. What troubles me, though, is that I am not sure whether Dr. Kazez understands the basics of philosophy, the basics of Francione's position, or how these ideas are related.
Again, I am not claiming in absolute terms that Dr. Kazez has managed to go through several years of graduate study and almost two decades of post-graduate professional life without understanding even basic philosophical terminology and how to use it. I just wonder why she seems intent on keeping her knowledge of the basics entirely to herself and, seemingly, intentionally misrepresenting these ideas on which she professes to have some authority.
3a) Dr. Kazez seems to prefer silly rhetorical questions and polemics to substantive discussion. Francione's offered to have her on his podcast a couple of times now. She's dismissed my plea for her to take animals seriously and go vegan (that makes me sad). I think it's a shame when someone is willing to go to all the effort to write a book about animal ethics but can't be troubled to read a few labels, make a few basic changes to eating habits, buy some new clothes as expense allows, change some household items, etc. Going vegan, typically, is trivially easy for most people.
I also think it reflects a kind of bad faith when we're reluctant to engage others in a serious dialogue about their ideas and instead rely on rhetorical grandstanding and summary dismissals. She has so far refused to apologize to Francione for a ridiculous misrepresentation of his position. Personally, I think that evinces a serious lack of professionalism on her part, but I guess I'm old-fashioned about these things. More worrisome, I imagine that she'd refuse to give the students she has "taught" over the years their money back (she should really consider it). Most worrisome, she is not giving other animals what she owes them, and that's veganism and the abolition of their slavery.
I'm sorry that Dr. Kazez found my encouraging her to take nonhuman animals seriously and to go vegan offensive. I wasn't denigrating her or her vegetarianism, although as a matter of reality, vegetarianism involves animal use and harm. In fact, I was assuming in good faith that she was a relatively decent and moral personal capable of understanding the arguments when they were presented to her. I'm sorry she misunderstood the gesture, even if I find it strange and troubling when people take offense at good faith. Nevertheless, I still don't have any personal ill will for her, even if she's insistent on proving that I mistook her and her capabilities.
3b) But, and here I pause theatrically to add some studious emphasis to what I am about to write, it does not follow from this that she should not go vegan. Again, we're still just talking about basic reasoning here. If I were doing something racist (or sexist, or heterosexist, or speciesist, etc.), if someone took the time to help correct me, I wouldn't be off the hook because I was offended by the correction. This goes back to the difference between explaining behaviour and justifying it. We cannot excuse ourselves from doing what is right just because anyone's attempts to correct us offends us.
Children use this type of reasoning a lot, but in an adult, it's surprising. So and so was doing X to me and so I shouldn't have to do Y or should be allowed to do Z! Yes, it's troubling behaviour, but everyone loses his, her or zir temper every once in a while. Even academics (loose use of the term here) are people. What's more troubling, though, is the basic misunderstanding of moral reasoning that this kind of insistent claim reflects in someone with a PhD in philosophy.
So, I still think Dr. Kazez should go vegan and should apologize to Gary Francione. Of course, it is entirely her prerogative, but I think both would be the right thing to do. I also think Dr. Kazez should take her academic responsibilities more seriously and that she should brush up on her basic knowledge of history, sociology and reasoning skills. It's never too late! But if she can only go vegan, that's really the most important thing for her to do.
That's not just true for Dr. Kazez; it's true for everyone. If you are not yet vegan, you should go vegan today. If you want to learn more about abolition, read my previous articles or learn more about the approach at www.abolitionistapproach.com. And University of Arizona, please let me know if I should be expecting my diploma soon!
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