There are, of course, some advocates who oppose the personal adoption of nonhuman animals, and some who promote euthanasia or abandonment as the solution. According to Newsweek, �PETA has killed more than 17,000 animals, nearly 85 percent of all those it has rescued� since 1998. There are others who propose that using other animals is morally fine, so long as we also care for them. This blog doesn't address either perspective at length; both are very deeply misguided. The untimely killing of other animals or their abandonment are morally derelict and speciesist; the proposal that we can use others so long as we care for them is deeply problematic and speciesist.
However, there are other advocates who argue that we are doing more harm than good to �the movement� with personal adoption and that domesticated animals should be placed in sanctuaries. When this notion functions as a blanket statement that precludes the personal adoption of other animals who require personal care, I believe it is often very misguided.
There are, of course, serious moral considerations to be taken into account with personal adoption. I don�t deal with those issues in this blog, but I am not dismissing them summarily. However, some other animals simply cannot care for themselves and this leaves us with the moral problem of what care is best.
If we promote care, it should be in light of those rights, not in place of them. As Francione writes:
�[F]ood� animals, �laboratory� animals, rodeo �animals�, or �circus� animals assume various social constructs of the �animal� other and all of these characterizations normatively assume that the �animal� is a �thing� that we can use for our �benefit.�
(Francione, Animals as Persons, p. 188)
To propose that we should not fulfill our duties to care for domesticated nonhumans in light of the possibility that it could leave some standers-by with the wrong impression is to return us to a position in which we think of other animals as things; only in this instance as burdens we might reasonably shrug off rather than as tools that might benefit us.
First, we should understand that insofar as abolitionists oppose property status, it should be on the basis that each individual nonhuman animal holds the moral right not to be used as property, and so, should have the legal right not to be used as property. If we are opposed to slavery, and if we are in favor of its abolition, then we should be so out of sense of moral obligation to other individual animals as rights-holders. It is for this reason that we work to establish their legal right not to be used as property. If we cannot pay what we owe (providing care) without leaving others with the wrong impression (that nonhumans are property that we care for), then paying what we owe should always be more important to our thinking and practice.
An example: Let's say that I believe that nonviolence is morally important, and so, as my general political objective, I want a nonviolent world. Let's say, in light of this view, that I believe that beating someone is morally wrong and that I have some duty to protect the rights of others if someone is being beaten. Let's also say I'm opposed to prostitution as an institution because I believe it is a violent economic relationship, and that I have some duty to promote an end to prostitution.
With these moral views in mind, let's say I see someone beating a prostitute on the street. Let's say that I shout help or phone the police on his/her/zir behalf. This act may leave at least some bystanders with the impression that I support prostitution. This would be a bad inference on their parts, but people often reason poorly. It seems clear that if I take my objective of nonviolence seriously then
- First, I have a some clear duty to intercede on behalf of the prostitute as the victim of violent behaviour,
- Second, that no one should reasonably infer that just by trying to stop the public beating of a prostitute that I endorse prostitution,
- Third, that what I owe the prostitute in definite terms is more morally pressing than the conclusion that the crowd may or may not draw and
- Fourth, and finally, it is really not possible to understand my helping the prostitute in this instance and opposing prostitution as an institution as mutually exclusive, insofar as they both further my objective, which is to promote nonviolence.
Certainly, we are not morally required to risk our own safety to intervene nonviolently in this kind of situation of immanent harm (so the analogy is not entirely apt). We might propose that it would be morally wrong for me to start beating the perpetrator in turn. But it would be morally problematic to propose that someone was doing 'something wrong' simply by nonviolently opposing the rights violation of another person in a situation of immanent harm in a socially appropriate way because it 'might leave people with the wrong impression'. Similarly, it is morally problematic to propose that personal adoption of a nonhuman animals is wrong because it may harm the movement.
Second, we must understand that these individual rights and our duties in light of them should always take precedence over the possible broader social consequences that we might imagine. It is not enough to ask: what do we owe other animals generally? We must also ask: what do I owe the particular animals (human or non) as individuals? Of course, there may be conflicts between individual rights holders, but that is meaningfully different from proposing that we take the negative opinions of some more seriously than what we owe other animals.
I'm not an ethologist, but two things we should keep in mind with respect to almost all other animals. Most of them have 'natures' in the sense that they have biological predispositions and capabilities that help them to perceive and respond to the world. Humans, for example, have a capability for language, and that tends to make them social for the most part. But we all know there are plenty of anti-social human beings, and, in part, this is the result of how they are socialized, personal preferences, etc.
Many animal species are socialized individually, and that includes 'wild' and 'feral' animals. The difference is that some are socialized with humans as care givers, some not. Even if a species is not domesticated per se, if the individuals involved have been socialized around human people, naturally, that makes a difference to what we should consider to be optimal care. Those socialized with humans are probably going to do much better with human care in general circumstances, and even those not socialized with humans are probably going to do much better with human care depending on the circumstances.
For example, the shelter cats that live with my partner and I would probably do poorly even in a very well-suited colony environment. The semi-feral cats that live with us might be fine in a colony in a nonurban area of the world with a climate that suits them, but they also may not be. But, definitely, in an urban area in a climate that reaches well below 0C in the winters, they are all much better off with us (indoors!).
Finally, the personal adoption of domestic animals may leave others with the sense that it is morally acceptable to keep nonhuman animals as property but shelters and sanctuaries do not necessarily address this problem. Of course, it�s not only possible but likely that personal adoption does convince at least some people that it is acceptable to keep nonhuman animals as property. First, however, we should not subject the fulfillment of our moral duties to the bad inferences of others. Second, it's not clear that sanctuaries would not still convince some people that it is morally acceptable to keep someone nonhuman animals as property. Further, many supposed sanctuaries actively use nonhumans to drive donations, some while promoting animal products, serving animal products or otherwise, continuing to profit at the expense of nonhuman animals.
Third, we're still 'keeping them as property' today even in sanctuaries from a legal perspective as much as we're 'keeping them as property' at a personal level. The solution, in this instance, is not to refuse rescue work or personal adoption, but to continue to educate people about speciesism, why it is morally wrong, and why the abolition of animal use and veganism are moral imperatives.
The realities of the present situation leave us with limited choices. There are simply too many domesticated animals that need care today and abolitionist shelters are too far from existing; personal adoption is the only meaningful choice today for most care givers and most care receivers. While thinking and imagining alternatives is very valuable to our work, we must also be mindful of the realities of any given moral situation.
Of course, should certainly create facilities that can provide optimal care for domesticated animals, and it's not clear that personal adoption is always the best choice for all species. In the meantime, though, we cannot meaningfully consider the personal adoption (of a person who has rights to whom we owe a duty of care) and the building sanctuaries/shelters (for persons who have rights and to whom we owe a duty of care) to be mutually exclusive work.
If we stopped personally adopting nonhuman animals, a great many would die of starvation, cold or other means. That doesn't mean we shouldn't support shelters or sanctuaries. It does mean, however, that until there are shelters that could actually do the work, whether personal adoption or sanctuaries are better reflects mostly a thought experiment.
It also raises a serious moral question why so many vegans are so unreflectingly forgiving of themselves and yet so comfortable turning their backs on those dependent on us for care. This almost certainly leaves many people with the impression that nonhuman animals are simply things we don�t use. Other animals are persons with rights, and our actions should be guided by this principle.
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