There is an argument common among horseback riding enthusiasts (even among those who self-identify as vegans) that horses receive pleasure from riding, and therefore, it is morally defensible. It is, they argue (contrafactually), like playing with a cat or a dog. But this kind of argument should pose those vegans (and the rest of us who can reason well) with a serious moral and intellectual problem, even if it doesn't. If we take the pleasure/suffering an act gives as the only morally relevant criterion in forming our moral judgements, then it's not clear what utilitarians would propose as the substantive moral difference between horseback riding, bestiality or arguably, pedophilia.
This isn't to say that pleasure is bad. We all like pleasure. I get pleasure from drinking espresso (and pooping!), as all my Twitter followers know by now. It's just not an adequate basis for making moral decisions. For example, I'm sure it's very unpleasurable when I take my cat to the vet and he has his temperature taken the hard way. It would hurt if the doctor had to break my leg in order to more properly set it. But both would still be the right thing to do because right and wrong are more than an oversimplified matter of intuitively trying to decide what decision involves the most amount of pleasure or suffering.
First, it seems clear to me that while horses enjoy running, it's not at all clear that they enjoy hauling a sack of human fat around on their backs while they do so. Ethologically, horses are perfectly fine running without riders. Many of them don't need to be �broken� in the way that most people imagine from the westerns they watched as children. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that, typically, it is not impossible or impractical for most people to avoid riding a horse. I've never ridden one. I think the rest of us will live without doing so. Horseback riding for pleasure involves the unnecessary exploitation of a nonhuman animal, and that's what makes it not acceptable for vegans.
Further, they're also perfectly capable of running by themselves and don't require human involvement to do so. Walking and guiding for therapy perhaps, but not riding for pleasure. Moreover, there's something that should provoke our suspicions when someone tries to argue that a kind of slavery gives pleasure to a human or nonhuman animal. There is a difference between play and slavery, and if it's not obvious to someone who self-identifies as vegan, then I worry for the world and all the nonhuman animals in it.
But, and second, let's imagine that a horse sneaks up on you, knocks you over and forces you onto his or her back. Vegans (and all rational people) should still refuse to ride. The idea that because an animal takes pleasure in a particular kind of use, and therefore, it's not just justifiable but good, opens the door to any other number of misguided ideas. For example, if it's morally good to ride a horse because the horse is pleasured by the action, then why isn't bestiality a moral problem? In fact, Peter Singer has already come out and stated his view that bestiality is morally fine in an articulate defense of sexual relations between human and nonhuman animals, in which he argues that �sex with animals does not always involve cruelty� (c.f., his essay �Heavy Petting� in Nerve, 2001).
Let me be clear about my own unwavering close-mindedness on this issue: animals are not ours to use for a sexy time, period.
Third, if we accept bestiality as morally good, then what's the moral difference between bestiality and pedophilia? If we're all animals, and we should give equal moral consideration to equal interests based on the pleasurable consequences of an act, what's the difference from a utilitarian perspective? Let me be perfectly clear about my own puritanical fundamentalism on this question: I don't consider pedophilia to be a moral position; I consider it to be a moral problem and a very serious one. I feel the same way about bestiality, horseback riding, free range eggs and other supposedly less cruel treatment of nonhuman animals. Use is the problem, not treatment.
To be clear, I am not saying that Singer has defended pedophilia, although he has defended both bestiality and 'equal consideration'. I'm saying that horseback riding, pedophilia and bestiality all cause harm, that because there is no consent in the way that consenting adults can consent, that all three are immoral, and that they all pose us with a moral problem for similar reasons. I'm also pointing out one of the logical implications to forming moral judgements solely on the basis of how much pleasure it gives another sentient animal.
Problematic enough? Disturbing, immoral, bizarre � it's difficult to know which adjective to pick and so, perhaps, best to probably use them all. A utilitarian approach to ethics (in general, but particularlny animal ethics) is problematic. But still, it goes further.
This line of reasoning would also prohibit us from treating many of the injuries of nonhuman animals or even saving their lives if it caused them or others pain in doing so. If animals have no interest in continuing their lives, as Singer argues, then the suffering we would often cause them even in setting a broken wing or adopting a companion animal may be unjustifiable, even if it continues their lives. Here we see the basis for PITA's defense for the euthanasia of healthy, adoptable companion animals. Neither PITA nor Peter Singer are seriously committed to an animal rights-based view.
In the interests of full disclosure, I grew up in farm country. I live with several cats today and have lived with cats most of my life. I've watched them live, grow old, and die. But anyone who knows anything about nonhuman animals � at all � knows that they have an interest in continuing their lives. Whether it's the thrashing of the lobster or the terror of the cow facing slaughter, they do not have to be able to reflect on themselves as subjects of a life, have a chat about Sunday's game and look forward to drinks on Friday in order to know that they are being harmed, that they do not want that harm and that they can perceive an immediate future in which responding to that harm might get them free of it. Utilitarians may not take this seriously, but animal rights advocates definitely should.
Pet your cat, your dog, your gerbil or your rat, smile at your fish, admire your bird, hug your kids, walk your horse, etc. But surely, as a moral community, we can draw the line between those kinds of acts and using nonhuman animals in ways that supposedly pleasure them but really pleasure us. For a utilitarian view, it's not clear that there is a line to be drawn; indeed, for a utilitarian, drawing the line itself may pose a moral problem (depending on the strand of utility).
But for vegans who take the rights of nonhuman animals seriously, however, there is a line: vegans shouldn't ride horses any more than they should make love to sheep. It's non-negotiable, unequivocal and clear. Whether or not an animal �is used� by an action should provide the basis for forming our moral judgement (whether or not something is wrong or right) and the moral response we issue (what we do about it), not whether or not human beings imagine that that use is pleasurable. For abolitionist vegans, nonhuman animals have a right not to be used as property, and veganism is the lived daily pratice of taking those rights seriously.
No comments:
Post a Comment