One of the most common questions I am asked (and I'm sure this is the case for people who have been vegan for a while) is: is X or Y vegan? Is eating placenta vegan? Is buying second-hand leather shoes vegan? Is horseback riding vegan (it's not!)? What about eating in nonvegan restaurants? What about honey? And so on. But what this really reflects is uncertainty about what veganism is and what veganism is not.
These questions are usually not difficult to answer. Vegans don't use wool yarn. They don't eat honey. They don't wear silk. They don't ride horses. They don't keep flea circuses. And so on. But some questions do require some thinking about veganism, not just as a checklist of ingredients, but how it provides a framework for forming moral judgements with respect to our relationship with human and nonhuman animals. In fact, one of the things that I've discovered is that many self-identified vegans are unfamiliar with the definition of veganism. To wit:
�The word 'veganism' denotes a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude � as far as is possible and practical � all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.�
This is the Vegan Society's definition and others very similar to it have been the norm since Donald Watson founded the Vegan Society in 1994 and invented the term vegan. Words change over time, but as a social process; that is meaningfully different from attempts over the years to muddy and misrepresent what �vegan� means by many, many regulationist groups. This reflects a strategy of trying to undermine veganism as an important part of a meaningful praxis that seeks to help nonhuman animals. But there are a lot of common misunderstandings of veganism that are completely innocent.
First, people who eat animal products regularly and intentionally are not vegan, period. That includes honey. There is no meaningful moral distinction to be made between one athropod (e.g., lobsters) and another arthropod (e.g., bees) in terms of whether or not we should avoid using them or their products on moral grounds. Further, people who are not vegan for ethical reasons that involve nonhuman animals in some way at least are not properly vegan. Also, neo-Nazis who eat a plant-based diet for reasons of personal purity are not properly vegan. Furthermore, �health food nuts� who eat only raw fruit solely because they believe it will protect them from cancer are not vegan. Further still, �environmetalists� who eat a plant-based diet solely for the love of Gaia and/or to build a world in which everyone can drive a Prius are not vegan. And, of course, veg*ns who only eat a little whey once every three months are not vegan.
Some of these people may still be mostly good people (obviously not the nazi and probably not the health food nut). But many of them may be educable about veganism. But just because you're a nice person, it doesn't mean you're vegan any more than if you're a nice person, you must also be 6' 11� tall. Veganism is not a social club. Veganism provides a clear, rational and impersonal way to evaluate behaviour that is either vegan or not. Of course, mistakes happen, labels are misread, people are confused about animal use (often intentionally confused by the regulationist movement) and it's not even always clear as to which ingredients in any given product are animal derived. But by definition vegans avoid contributing to cruelty toward and exploitation of nonhuman animals. People who act habitually in ways that obviously and unnecessarily contribute to the cruelty or exploitation of nonhuman animals in ways that are easy to avoid are not vegan. That's a pretty liberal definition when it comes down to it.
Second, there is a common misunderstanding actively promoted by the regulationist crowd that veganism is a means to reducing suffering. This is disingenuous. Veganism is a moral imperative (that is, something that we should do because it's the right thing in and of itself to do). Further, the definition above makes it clear that exploitation and cruelty are both distinguishable but equal concerns. The Society (intentionally or not) was obviously concerned enough about exploitation, that it might be perceived as not involving cruelty, that the Society explicity mentions it.
Moreover, this kind of well-intended but misguided thinking fails to account for all of the suffering we may have to cause nonhuman animals when we care for them properly. Following this line of reasoning, that treatment is what counts, it might be perceived as cruel, and therefore, not vegan, to set the broken wing of a bird. This is deeply misguided and proposes an irrationality that borders on cultish. If I have to take my dog or my child to the doctor to set a broken leg, it's going to hurt, but it's still the right thing to do.
Third, as one of my colleagues has put it, many people assume that to be vegan is to be an ideal moral agent (someone who does everything right all the time). You often hear this sentiment expressed as �no one can be perfectly vegan!�. This is misguided and a misunderstanding of what veganism entails. Veganism provides general moral guidance. It is not �not vegan� to walk on a sidewalk manufactured with animal products if it is impossible or impractical to avoid walking on that sidewalk; there are many other, similarly justifiable exceptions (e.g., riding the bus, taking life saving medications, etc.). No vegan needs to be perfect in order to be vegan, just as no feminist, no anti-racist and no anti-heterosexist needs to be perfect to be any of those things. They just have to meet a reasonable baseline, and the Society's definition or ones very much like it provide that baseline for vegans.
Of course, we should work to eliminate sidewalks manufactured with animal products, but simply walking on them doesn't make us �not vegan�. The way the system is arranged today limites our choices. I'm a Marxist, but I still have to pay my taxes. It doesn't follow from this that we should use animal products when we have a choice not to do so. Further, the idea that veganism requires perfection assumes that we can't or shouldn't distinguish between an animal use that is trivial to avoid (e.g., eating a live veal calf because it pleasure us to do so) and an animal use that is almost impossible (e.g., eating corn grown in the Midwest). Most small children could figure out the difference here, and yet it really seems to puzzle much of the leadership of the regulationist movement. This is also very, very deeply misguided.
Fourth, there is a common misunderstanding that veganism necessarily requires a rights-based view and/or an abolitionist approach. This is also not the case, since there are other moral frameworks from which veganism could be justified. The rights-based framework is the most practical and useful in my view, and it affords the best protection for nonhuman animals; the abolitionist approach provides the most meaningful and practical theory for organizing our work to eliminate the property status of nonhuman animals.
But I still identify myself as an abolitionist vegan because it is necessary and appropriate to do so. We must always be wary of a tendency to conflate what is the theory and what is the pratice of our praxis. These are closely related, but they are not the same. As an abolitionist vegan, the rights of animals not to be used as property is the motivation and the theory that guides my veganism as a lived daily practice and as a baseline for taking the rights of nonhuman animals seriously. This isn't necessarily the case for all vegans, but it should be.
So much confusion. But with these basic misunderstandings cleared away, how do we go about determining whether or not X or Y is vegan? First, we should always start from the assumption that the use of animal products, animal labor, or other actions that contribute to the cruelty oor exploitation of nonhuman animals require moral justification. That seems simple enough on its face based on the definition, and yet many self-identified vegans have trouble with it.
However, there's also a common perception that vegans need to justify why other vegans shouldn't use easily avoided animal products. I've always found this strange and this is really the wrong way to think about it. In fact, it just reproduces what every nonvegan already believes: that nonhuman animal use is normatively fine, and there needs to be some justification as to why we shouldn't use nonhuman animals; it's the other way around. That is, vegans should always start from the assumption that any animal product use/animal labor of any kind is not justified or excusable.
If any vegan (and really any moral person) wants to use an animal product or person (for his or her labor), then he or she has a reasonable duty to show why it's a necessary use and/or why that use is impractical or impossible to avoid (or to put it another way, why it is morally justifiable or morally excusable). Sidewalks, bike tires, etc., are impractical/impossible to avoid. Life-saving medications are legitimately necessary and also impractical/impossible to avoid. Animal-fertilized agriculture would be almost impossible to avoid for most vegans. The only way to even adopt a nonhuman animal within the existing system is to claim his or her as personal property. Etc. But if you have the choice to never walk on a sidewalk made with animal products, never ride a bike made with animal products, eat only veganic agricultural products, etc. there's no reason to go out and do any of these things.
For some uses there will be reasonable arguments to be made as to whether or not a use is really impractical/impossible to avoid, whether or not it's really necessary. There may also be variances across individuals (e.g., what may be legitimately necessary and/or impossible/impractical to avoid may be different). But the onus falls on each person doing the using to justify his or her use rationally, transparently and correctly.
So, is X or Y vegan? If it's a food product, and it contains animal ingredients that were intentionally added, then it's not vegan, period. It is impossible to avoid unintentional added nonhuman animal ingredients due to shared equipment. It is impossible/impractical for most vegans to avoid food grown using animal-based agriculture. If the use is for entertainment or clothing and is solely for human pleasure, then it is also not vegan, period.
Is it really impractical or impossible for vegans to typically avoid wool, honey, flea circuses, zoos, horseback riding, free range veal or other animal uses that involve cruelty or exploitation? Of course not. As for many other more complicated cases, it depends; what is the justification for this use? First, how might a particular animal use involve a threat to someone's life and/or someone's basic rights (how might it be morally justifiable from a vegan perspective)? Second, why would it be impractical or impossible for someone to avoid (how might it be morally excusable from a vegan perspective)? Let's take the case of a second-hand leather-bound book, since this question came up for me recently and is slightly more complicated. Also, please note, this is a question of determining justifiable and excusable only insofar as it relates to veganism. Because something may be justifiable or excusable from a vegan prespective, it does not necessarily follow that one should do it.
Often, the circumstances of a situation are important to helping us to form the correct moral judgement. For example, to push a child down for fun and to push a child out of the way of an oncoming car may look like the same action (pushing a child) to space aliens, but to rational people, these are meaningfully different actions.
Returning to our leather-bound book, in the first case, it is justifiable to use other animals (including human beings) when our basic rights face immanent harm. For example, let's say you only have a leather bound book (a heavy one) with a tiger and your grandmother in a lifeboat. Your only weapon to knock your grandmother unconscious before she kills and eats either you or the tiger is the book. The use of the book in that instance may be justifiable from a vegan perspective. However, it would not be morally justified for a vegan to use a leather bound book as a paperweight or to pummel Barney, and so on.
In the second case, the nuances of a situation often come into play. For example, there may be situations in which it is legitimately impractical or impossible to avoid purchasing a leather bound book. Let's say there's no library copy. Let's say there are no second hand copies. Let's say I cannot borrow a copy from a classmate. Let's say I cannot get an electronic version from the publisher. Let's say I cannot get an exemption from my instructors, the Dean or the school. Let's say I must read this book to complete my veterinary degree so that I can work in a nonhuman animal sanctuary saving the lives of nonhuman animals every day for the rest of my life. Let's say I exhaust all the practical and possible alternatives that might allow me to avoid purchasing the book. The purchase might be excusable in that instance, from a vegan perspective, just as walking around on nonvegan sidewalks might be excusable. But if you're going through finishing school and balancing a book on your head to correct your posture, or buying a book for a paperweight, then it would not be excusable to buy a leather one to do so.
In short, it's always best to start with the assumption that no animal use is ever justified, and then try to determine from there whether or not avoiding that use is either 1) legitimately impossible or impractical and necessary or 2) involves you or another rights-holder in an irremediable rights conflict. If a use cannot be rationally justified or excused using either criteria, then it wouldn't/shouldn't be acceptable to vegans.
What is important to remember, always, is what's at stake for nonhuman animals in their use as property. Animal use is often remarkably trivial for us (and trivial often overstates the importance), but it often means their lives to them.
If you're self-identifying as vegan now and have common questions over what is or is not vegan (or doing things you shouldn't be!), I hope this blog helps to clarify what you owe nonhuman animals. But if you're not already vegan, now that you understand that veganism doesn't require perfection, is simple and straightforward, and does not involve a cultish religiosity but simple reasoning based on evidence to make moral decisions, I hope you will take the rights of nonhuman animals not to be used as property seriously and go vegan today.
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