This question is circulating both the vegan blogosphere with interesting pieces from Stephanie Ernst and a response from Myl�ne Ouellet, as well as other social media. Since I hate to be left out of the conversation, some thoughts follow.
ETA: I have changed this blog based on some feedback from a colleague, which I thought was quite helpful and useful. No need for anyone to panic. I often change my mind when I hear a better rational account for something, and I think differentiating between wide and narrow duties provides a simpler and better way of thinking about what we owe other animals than differentiating between ought and obligation does.
Duty, obligation and ought: What's the difference? (or, rather, what's the difference between wide and narrow duties?)
The question seems to be whether we should think of activism (beyond going vegan) as a duty or just as something we ought to do. Since I am not a philosopher (caveat lector!), I often use philosophical terms incorrectly and interchangeably (e.g., "I ought to do X", "I am obligated to do X", "I have a duty to do X"). Some philosophers differentiate between ought and obligation in relation to duties, while others see 'having a decisive reason to do X' means we ought to do X and that that is basically the same as saying that we have an obligation to do X.
In the original version of this essay, I differentiated them, but based on some comments from a colleague, I think this was a mistake on my part. Instead, we might say that we have wide duties, and narrow duties. For example, let's say you invite me to your house for dinner. I might have a narrow duty not to pee on your couch as a guest. I am obligated not to do so. I ought not to do so (in the sense that I have decisive reasons not to do so). In light of modern Western hospitality customs, if you and I are friends, I might want to bring something delicious.
But I do not have a narrow duty to bring cookies (or anything for that matter). I am not obligated to bring cookies (or anything else) specifically, the same way I am obligated not to pee on your couch, specifically. I do not necessarily have similarly decisive reasons to bring cookies (although I may) in the way that I do typically have decisive reasons not to pee on your couch (although some hosts may be more open minded about this). In short, some duties (narrow duties) are fulfilled in very specific ways. Some duties (wide duties) may be fulfilled with a wider range of actions.
There might be decisive reasons that we should be excused, or we might be released from fulfilling the duty, or other justification, and so on, but the onus falls on us to justify. For example, if I don't pay my taxes, I am typically required to explain in a clear, well-reasoned way (i.e., that I provide some justification) why I should be excused from paying them or why it is wrong to expect me to pay them.
If I don't shower for a day, for example, I do not necessarily required to provide a clear and well-reasoned explanation (or justification) or even an unclear, mumbled and incoherent one for why I did not shower that day, although if I don't shower for months, people might start to legitimately wonder if I am not neglecting a wide duty to properly care for myself, and I may actually have to account for my actions.
So, we might say, for example, that we ought to go vegan, and, indeed, we might also say that we are obligated to go vegan in light of the sentience of nonhuman animals, their interests, and their basic right not to be used as property. We might also say that we ought and are obligated to engage in activism beyond going vegan, but that to go vegan is a narrow duty, and the activism we might engage in beyond veganism is a relatively wide one.
Veganism as a moral baseline (of animal advocacy activism)
Having written the foregoing, ought we engage in activism (beyond going vegan) with respect to nonviolence, including veganism, anti-racism, anti-sexism, and so on? Of course, I think the answer is yes. But I do not think it follows that it is required that anyone do so.
I think people misunderstand veganism as a moral baseline in two ways: first, in the sense that it means "going vegan is all that we owe other animals" and second, in the sense that it means "veganism is not itself a form of activism." I think the notion of "activism" is somewhat sociologically problematic, but if I stopped drinking Coca Cola during the 1980s (which I did) because of their investment in South African apartheid, not many people would say: "that's not activism!"
Oddly (although veganism is not a boycott), I think people would be more inclined to see that as a type of activism than if I went vegan, but I can't account for strange inferences. What "veganism is a moral baseline" means is that: if you only can do one thing in relation to nonhuman animals, then you should at least go vegan; but second, that if you can do more, you should do more. That is, a baseline is exactly that: a minimum. The minimum is required. More than the minimum is good, but very specific actions beyond that minimum are not necessarily required.
For example, one might engage in rescue work, abolitionist vegan education, prepare a plant based dish for a work function and explain veganism, etc. These all fulfill a wide duty to help other animals beyond simply going vegan ourselves.
From an abolitionist standpoint, there is no narrow duty to engage in specific types of activism other than going vegan (although any additional activism should meet abolitionist criteria). However, taking the rights of nonhuman animals seriously and going vegan is itself a form of activism. It often models just and virtuous behaviour, and it has clear economic consequences. Most important, it ends our unjust behaviour.
Finally, veganism (and nonviolence more generally) is a kind of activism. If everyone in the world simply stopped actively harming everyone else unjustifiably (and started the active process of avoiding harm), the world would be definitely improved. It seems unintuitive to think of the social transformation toward wide-scale and systemic harmlessness as something other than a kind of active behaviour. In that sense, our narrow duty is to go and stay vegan, even if we ought to do more at times if we can. Both are active behaviors, even if we are cannot be more active in all circumstances.
Why is activism as a moral requirement problematic?
If we say that activism involves a set of narrow duties (akin to not using nonhuman animals in the first place), that poses the problem that, as my colleague suggested, it would create an endless string of demands upon us to be activists at every turn (although it it not clear to me that that is what Ouellet was claiming -- I am not staking a claim, simply confirming my ignorance). However, as a general matter, I think I agree with his concerns as I understand them. Moreover, it poses the practical problem of having to continuously assess each demand in relation to every other demand placed upon is. This might be morally and intellectually overwhelming.
Intuitively, activism beyond veganism as a set of narrow duties (e.g., you must rescue a cat, you must attend this protest or a protest for that matter) also seems to suggest that not using animals and being an activist that opposes animal use are morally equivalent, and that we could reasonably exchange them. Let's say I have a narrow duty to run 50 miles and I have a narrow duty to swim 20 miles in any given week. Let's say I only have time to do one of them on a particular day this week through no fault of my own. Would it be reasonably excusable for me to do one and not the other? Most people would say yes, that failing in my obligation to do one was wrong, but understandable (depending on the specific reasoning).
If any kind of animal advocacy and veganism itself are duties on a par, it might follow that I could be excused from grabbing a big Mac if I am legitimately late through no fault of my own to my local AR book club meeting. This would be problematic from an animal rights standpoint. It does not necessarily follow from this that we should never be excused from unavoidable animal use (e.g., walking on sidewalks made with animal products) in order to conduct educational work. I am only saying that it is good to think as clearly as possible about the relationship between activism and avoiding harm. It seems reasonable that we should have decisive reasons for the actions we take with respect to other animals.
It doesn't necessarily follow from this that all duties are absolutely equal or that we could not reconcile differing duties, etc., or that some duties are equivocal and some note. Duties are unequivocal; how we might fulfill wide duties, however, is simply more open-ended. I am simply saying that, in addition to being impractical, posing activism beyond veganism as a narrow set of required duties may be very confusing and may lead people to draw very misguided inferences about what they should do, what they may be excused from, etc.
Do we owe other animals restitution for our time as nonvegans?
I think that as a typical matter, when we violate the rights of others, that it is normal to have a desire to make restitution and that we may owe them something beyond simply not using them in the future. For example, if I step on your toe, I probably owe you an apology as a kind of restitution. Restitution for murder, rape, torture, etc., is typically very substantial in the West but this has not always been the case.
Moreover, the nature and degree of restitution varies substantially. Sometimes, it is symbolic. Sometimes it involves money. Sometimes it involves reciprocal harm (e.g., an eye for an eye). It is difficult to asses whether and when to provide restitution with regard to wider systemic harms (e.g., systemic racism), and they often involve a great deal of debate. Suffice it to say, restitution (even when it just involves human beings arguing over a property boundary on the People's Court) is a complicated moral and legal matter.
With respect to our violations of the rights of nonhuman animals, the idea that we can make restitution is more problematic. Most of the rights-holders we would have violated as nonvegans are dead or persons to whom we cannot make any kind of proper restitution. We cannot make restitution to their families. Further, it seems misguided to suggest that we can make restitution to random rights-holder X for what we did to random rights-holder Y.
In fact, this way of thinking about the problem could be potentially very confusing (and unhelpful) to understanding what we owe other animals as individual rights-holders. This way of thinking about restitution seems to suggest that if we are kind to cow X then we can be forgiven for killing and eating dog Y. That is obviously misguided. I am not suggesting that we should not engage in virtuous work with other animals (e.g., adoption). I am simply saying that we cannot buy our way to redemption, and we certainly should not think of ourselves as being in a position to buy an indulgence to cause harm with good works.
Since we should treat similar cases similarly, because of the complexities of restitution, because of the open-ended nature of restitution, and so on, I think it may be problematic to suggest very specific activism as a kind of restitution. However, I think a desire to act well in light of previous wrong actions is usually very normal, and that we should act well when it is reasonable for us to do so.
It's always better to do the right thing for the right reasons
Finally, we should also be concerned about privilege and activism. Going beyond veganism, many people simply do not know how to be more active, some people (quite legitimately) cannot be more active because of their particular (class, race, sex, ability, etc.) circumstances, some people focus on human rights issues or other kinds of activism, and so on. I believe that is all certainly understandable.
Solidarity work on behalf of nonhuman animals should not be conflated with veganism (either by vegans or nonvegans) and it should not be a pathetic subcultural bicep-flexing contest about who does more for the animals, as it often is in animal welfare advocacy circles. In short, I can understand why some people can't or don't get more active, even if I hope everyone will.
It's also worth noting that not all activism is helpful. In fact, I'm sure a great deal of PeTA's work is harmful to the interests of other animals. I think it's terrific if people want to jump in and get to work. But learning how to do activism correctly (from an operational, "how do I respond to someone's question" standpoint) and learning what kinds of activism are morally and practically correct (from an ideological, "how do I lay the ground work for social change� standpoint) are also very important types of work. Between doing the wrong thing for the right reasons and doing the right for the right reasons, I am in favor of the latter.
But the most important thing any of us can do to help nonhuman animals is to go vegan. If you are not vegan, please go vegan today. If you are not an abolitionist, you can learn more about the approach at www.abolitionistapproach.com.
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