I get a lot of people to admit that the way we raise animals is cruel and that we should avoid that but very few think we shouldn't use animals at all. For those people who are going down the happy meat path, what do you say? How do you start on the abolitionist notion? How do you appeal to a sense that animals shouldn't be used?Many advocates, even those who self-identify as abolitionists focus on cruelty as a gateway to talking about use, and this is problematic. What this assumes and furthers (in effect, if not intent) is a sense that animals are "things with feelings" rather than as persons with rights.
From an abolitionist perspective, the moral problem is not treatment, but use. Francione has a pair of good, recent articles on "happy meat", welfarism and the issues surrounding it (although there are undoubtedly more at his Web site):
- http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/new-welfarism-fails-on-its-own-terms/
- http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/some-comments-on-vegetarianism-as-a-gateway-to-veganism/
His most recent book Animals as Persons is also devoted to understanding nonhuman animals as persons and what that entails. As vegetarianism is not a meaningful gateway to veganism, and reform is not a meaningful gateway to abolition, neither is convincing someone that animals are "things with feelings" a meaningful gateway to convincing people that animals are persons with rights. As abolitionists, our role is to convince people that use is the problem because nonhuman animals are persons with rights.
It is not surprising that approaches that focus on cruelty tend to confuse many people about what exact moral problems animal advocacy seeks to solve and that they almost immediately encounters objections with respect to "happy meat". I do not believe that any animal is ever happy to be exploited, to have his or her interests disregarded, and so on. There is also plenty of evidence that humane, free run, cage free, etc., animal products do not even achieve the reduction in suffering that they claim. But we should always keep the focus of our outreach on the rights of nonhuman animals as persons and the moral duties we owe nonhuman animals in light of their personhood.
I realize this up-ends the entire 'received wisdom' of most animal advocacy practice today, but I have sufficient reasons to believe that these advocate practices are based on a mistunderstanding of the moral problem that animal use poses as well as no serious understanding of effective propaganda practices. Because animal advocates have focused on cruelty historically is not evidence that this is an effective way to do outreach, and, objectively, this approach is flawed for a number of reasons.
Rhetorically speaking, the "standard welfare outreach approach" is that we should convince someone that the way we raise nonhuman animals is the moral problem because they suffer as a result of their treatment. This is inimical to the abolitionist position that the moral problem is use, not treatment, and does not provide a strong footing, either for veganism or for abolition.
When we assume suffering is the problem, we might argue that vegan*sm is the solution to this problem. If we consider suffering primarily, then the implication is not veganism but anything that may or may not actually reduce suffering. Or, we might promote reforms of the present system as the solution to suffering as the problem. Or, we might promote direct action or violence as the solution to suffering as the problem. Or we might promote all three.
But insofar as "animal welfare" approaches in various forms focus on suffering, they fail to understand and communicate effectively to the public what we owe nonhuman animals as persons with rights to whom we owe unequivocal duties. Instead, the welfare approach tends to regard nonhumans as only "things with feelings" whose suffering we are trying to reduce. As Gary Francione argues in Rain Without Thunder, among other works, that is not a radical or new position, and in fact, has been around for a very long time. As a statistical matter, welfare has not made a serious dent in animal use; this is probably because it never seeks to convince anyone that animal use is a moral problem.
Further, if we fail to convince people that animal use is morally wrong because animals are rights-holders, we should not try to convince them that they should "cut back" in light of cruelty. First, we are in no moral position to bargain away the rights and interests of nonhuman animals and 2) it is not at all clear that saying "it's okay to harm some nonhuman animals some of the time" is an effective strategy to achieve an end to the general public perception that it is okay to harm some nonhuman animals some of the time.
In short, an upfront focus on the moral problems attending to cruelty followed by an explanation of the moral problems attending to animal use are at odds with one another in terms of their logical implications, and furthermore, there is no need to make extra work for ourselves. We should start by just explaining the moral problems attending to animal use.
Of course, in general, there is a fine and often problematic line between simply relaying the facts of certain realities: that most nonhuman animals suffer horribly as the result of factory farming, and convincing people that this is the moral problem. But even if we 'cap' a lengthy argument with respect to how horribly factory farm animals suffer, with a statement on use, the impression we are most likely to leave is that treatment is the problem. So, in many respects, I think it is best to
2) that because at least two of the interests they have (among many potentially) is to continue their lives and to be free from unnecessary suffering and exploitation.
Having laid the groundwork for the moral argument by establishing the morally relevant facts, I then explain that
3) in light of these interests, I have sufficient reasons to accord them a moral right not to be used as my resources because that is the simplest way to respect both interests and probably many others.
4) and that the logical implication of taking their right not to be used as a resource seriously is not to work to reduce their suffering whether through reforms, militancy or vegetarianism, or to regulate their legal status as our property, but rather not to use them at all when it is possible and pratical to do so (i.e.., to go vegan), to work to abolish their legal status as our property, and to work to educate others about the relationship and morally important nature of veganism, abolition and nonviolence accordingly.
I also answer questions about animal suffering or about health or environmental issues related to veganism, economics, etc., as they come up and as factually as I can. But I don't lead with these things, and I always try to keep the focus on the moral issues and our moral obligations to nonhuman animals as persons with rights rather than as "things with feelings". What is most important is to begin with a clear explanation of the moral considerations we owe other animals, their rights in light of that consideration, and how veganism and abolition stem as moral obligations from those rights.
Of course, most people will not immediately agree to this view. However, as advocates, we should assume that helping someone to understand veganism and animal rights fully, as well the moral frameworks that they propose, and how to incorporate these views into their lives will take more than a pamphlet, a casual conversation or a blog article. In fact, understanding and acting upon the position that animals are persons with rights is a habit that can only be cultivated more fully over time and with a great deal of practice.
Abolitionist veganism is the starting point of that practice. If you are not vegan, you should take the rights of nonhuman animals not to be used as property seriously and go vegan today. If you are already vegan, and you are not already an abolitionist, today's a great day to change you work to focus on more effective outreach for nonhuman animals embodied in the abolitionist approach.
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