Like all works of moral and theoretical genius, Marx and Engels' was both a definitive moral statement (a wall that said 'no further' to vice). But it also provided an open framework to apply and advance their thinking (an open door to virtue). Today, Marxists think about class struggle in ways slightly different from Marx and Engels entirely because their work was not historically bound in utter terms. Their thought was flexible and creative. It laid the ground work for people not just to apply their ideas, but to talk about them, think about them sincerely and to draw new and different moral conclusions in light of their work and the change in historical and social circumstances.
Prof. Francione's Six Principles of the Animal Rights Position in particular and his broader theoretical work in general do the same, and this blog is mostly a thought experiment on his argument that all animals have a right not to be used as property. His argument is both a definitive moral statement (that we should not use other animals unjustifiably, including human ones, and that veganism is the unequivocal baseline for that view), but it also opens a framework for the rest of us to think further and sincerely about what that means. Of course, we must oppose sexism, racism, heterosexism, classism, speciesism and other forms of irrational prejudice, we must promote the abolition of animal and not merely it's regulation, and we must better understand nonviolence as a moral imperative. But what else might we infer reasonably from the moral and theoretical framework that Francione's work creates? A handful of theses and aphorisms follow. Again, these are thought experiments to encourage discussion and thinking, not definitive statements, and none of them are particularly original, drawing almost entirely from Gary's work (except, of course, where he might disagree).
First, and foremost, Francione's work encourages stop thinking of morality as a merely a (deontological) checklist or a moral (utilitarian) calculation. Veganism is the unequivocal moral duty we owe other animals, but Francione has also argued that legal animal rescue and adoption, as well as creative nonviolent vegan education, are also very important. This creates a moral framework that a) requires us to consider new ways to understand what is possible and practical in terms of avoidance of animal use (the veganism part) and b) new ways to understand how we may work to end the property status of animals in particular, but all uses of animals in general. In short, Francione's work encourages to think about morality seriously, to allow it to permeate our lives as a lived daily practice, both in terms of what we owe others, but also how we might act more virtuously, to go past 'baselines' when there is an opportunity for us to do so. As abolitionists, we should allow our thinking about both our duties and how we can act more virtuously, as well as how we can engage with moral reality more accurately permeate our daily lives.
Second, I see one of the logical implications of Francione's work and its focus on nonviolence as being incompatible with supporting a modern military and modern military violence. It's certainly possible for people in the military to be vegan, and this is not a criticism of those presently in the military. In the United States (at least) funding for post-secondary education is remarkably low and yet military service among the poor is remarkably high. It's not a coincidence, but except in cases of self-defense, it strikes me that modern militarism of almost any kind would involve an abridgment of the sixth principle (if not others). Furthermore, Francione's work provides us with a framework for understanding modern military service as a kind of indentured servitude if not slavery. Those in the military are frequently used as instruments and indeed, the military often joking refers to its human resources as property. As abolitionists, I believe we should absolutely oppose the draft, almost certainly most military interventions and even the modern military as an organ of the state.
Third, it seems to me only reasonable that we should oppose modern human trafficking and slavery (whether legal or illegal). This seems obvious on its face, but there are also a number of liminal professions that we allow to function on the margins of society that resemble a kind of slavery in practice, even in they appear to involve a reciprocal contract relationship. For example, we should think further about whether teenage sexworkers, soldiers, migrant workers and other kinds of labour do not involve 'being used as property' or something very much like it. For other (Marxist) reasons, I oppose the sale of all labour, but if the sale of one type of labour does not involve similarly legitimate choices by profession, does not provide the same or similar protection from abuse, etc., (e.g., if the sexworker does not have the same type of choices and does not enjoy the same protections as does the Harvard law graduate), this poses us with a serious moral problem, even if it's not quite the same moral problem that nonhuman animal use poses us today. We have to ask, why is that the case? What implicit sexism, racism, classism or other irrational prejudice informs this inequality? Furthermore, we have to seriously ask, what should we do about? and take our answers seriously. As abolitionists, we should (at very least) oppose unequivocally systems of literal human slavery (e.g., in coffee and chocolate production, modern sexual slavery), but we should also work to rearrange society in such a way that also opposes the commodification of human beings.
Fourth, and somewhat related, we must seriously consider the reorganization of social relations between human beings so as to not use others as property. This doesn't, on its face, prohibit reciprocal exchanges and contracts, but it does call us to ensure these contracts are legitimately fair and that these kinds of exchanges are truly reciprocal. Anyone who looks at modern society can see that this is often not the case. Moreover, the prospect that we have a duty not to use others as property requires us to think much more seriously about social hierarchies in social relations. Some social relationships that involve authority, we may wish to keep (e.g., the relationship between teachers and students), but some we may not. More important, we must commit ourselves to scrutinizing how we relate to others socially and seriously consider that, even if another human being is not our literal slave, we may engage with them in a social relationship that may not accord them their personhood as meaningfully as we might.
Fifth, if we accord nonhuman animals inherent moral value and consider them as persons, then, as we (should) do with all persons, we owe them at least some moral consideration of their habitats. If we take nonhuman animals seriously as moral patients, then we must also take their homes, their drinking water, their food, and their share of nature as an instrument much more seriously than we have. Not every every environmentalist is an abolitionist (but s/h/ze should be) but every abolitionist should take the interest of nonhuman animals to their share of the ecosystem seriously.
Sixth, we must begin the social and cultural transformation required not only to end the property status of animals but to cultivate a habit of thinking of animals as persons both in ourselves and broader society. There is a gross misconception of Francione's work that he's 'only interested in ending the property status of animals' as if this were a vague abstraction, and as if we could all go home the moment the law changed regardless of what happens in broader society. This �critique� (and I use that word with remarkable generosity) is a kind of idiocy with that operates on many levels. I won't address it at length in this blog, but certainly, the whip that would have lashed Frederick Douglas and Harriet Tubman, as well as the laws and social prejudices that made their 'use as property' possible, was not an abstraction.
The abolition of the property status of nonhuman animals is a shorthand for social transformation. It proposes the elimination of the single most prominent and serious barrier to taking the personhood of nonhuman animals seriously and unfettering our activists and broader society from engaging in a more meaningful relationship with nonhuman animals. It will provide a firm legal basis for challenging all forms of social prejudice toward nonhuman animals. Like all tools, however, activists must be prepared to use the legal status of animals as persons to protect the interests of nonhuman animals and to fight speciesism. As veganism is the moral baseline for the abolitionist movement, the abolition of the property status of nonhumans is a legal and moral milestone in our work to end speciesism.
In closing, today we stand at the historical beginning of our thinking about what we owe nonhumans. We have only begun to adopt the practices that take their interests seriously. In broad social terms, someone has just suggested to us that those we have taken for granted as our slaves have a right not to be used like our property. This will be the first volley in a long but morally necessary social dialogue. Nevertheless, it's an argument in which reason, science and compassion are all on our side. It is remarkably important that none of us to be silent. The first step for any of us is small, but profoundly meaningful and easy: to take the rights of animals not to be used as property seriously and go vegan.
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