Let�s imagine that we encounter Simon, who is torturing a dog by burning the dog with a blowtorch. Simon�s only reason for torturing the dog is that he derives pleasure from this sort of activity. [�] Simon is violating a moral and legal rule that just about everyone agrees with�that it is wrong to inflict unnecessary suffering or death on animals. And what do we mean by �unnecessary�? We mean that it is wrong to inflict suffering or death on animals merely because it gives us pleasure or we find it amusing. Simon is inflicting unnecessary suffering and death on the dog; he is torturing an animal for no reason other than his pleasure and amusement.
Gary L. Francione
Simon the Sadist is a powerful metaphor, one that Francione introduces primarily in Introduction to Animal Rights, but now is a recurring figure in Francione�s work (with this particular sample taken from a piece about Michael Vick, whose violence has inspired a tremendous amount of anger in response). Although it is a recurring metaphor, it is not one that has been extensively explored.
Considering Francione's work more as a kind of moral theatre rather than purely as what is literally being proposed, I think Simon the Sadist reflects this double motion: to imagine the dog he blowtorches as a 'rights-holder', we start with a common idea of liberalism, but then we are already beginning a discussion of the dog's personhood and the moral value of that personhood.
Once we have started this dialogue, then we have already taken several important steps along a journey that leads us well past many of the signposts of the way that world is organized today, even if we're not entirely sure where it will lead us or all of what we'll discover about ourselves and others along the way. What Simon teaches us about non-violence is, I think, worth considering in detail.
Often, we may be unsure and unclear about what violence is, even if we often know it when we see it. But I do not think this prevents us from understanding clearly what non-violence is; and in this piece, I explore some of my own views (as they are informed by Francione's work). I argue that non-violence (as an ideology) is a refraining from, but it is also a drawing closer to and a belonging with. Of the three, we are most accustomed to thinking of it as embodied in the first. If I am using the word in an unusual way, perhaps I may be forgiven if I am, nevertheless saying something true, right or, if nothing else, novel.
Non-violence as a refraining fromMost are familiar with non-violence as a refraining from. That is, most of us would understand our duty to be non-violent toward others as 'not harming them', or for non-violent utilitarians, as not causing others suffering in undue ways. Pacifism, as one expression of non-violence, is a refraining from harm. This is not the same as simply �not harming.�
Only in a very basic, non-ideological sense could I refer to myself as �non-violent� when I am sleeping and not harming others. Instead, non-violence as a refraining from is an active behaviour. Non-violence as a refraining from expresses itself as an active practice of justice that calls us to avoid harming others, even when there are rational reasons to do so (personal gain, emotional gratification, utility, among others). Non-violence as a refraining from is a rational limit of the will.
Non-violence as a drawing closer toIdeologically speaking, non-violence, in my view is more than a simple refraining from. I say that it is also a �drawing closer�. It will not be immediately clear what I am proposing with this, but perhaps an example can show what I mean more clearly.
Let us say that I wish to act non-violently in a broader ideological sense. Let us say that I already practice non-violence as a literal refraining from violence. But let us say that I hold all others at a distance. Let us say that I apply the same sense of 'not harming' to all beings identically. Let us say that while I always refrain from direct harm, I never help. Is that all that is required for me to say, �yes, I am non-violent�? Or does this show us that understanding non-violence as solely a refraining from is lacking? If an elderly woman slips on the ice, it may not be violent to leave her there, but I would not say this is non-violent in the way that I mean it.
Intuitively, I find non-violence as a refraining from to be required but insufficient when I consider non-violence as a broader ideology. I believe that in some ways, non-violence requires that we also draw closer to others and to help them to draw closer to us. This is meaningfully different from �keeping handy� or �chasing down� others, both of which tend toward violence, both of which tend toward or embody the organization of other animals as objects for our use. A drawing closer is a movement made by one person toward another person. It involves acknowledgement of the other person as a someone rather than as a something to whom we owe something, but also as a person we would like to know better so that we might act better in relation to them.
If it is a form of violence to use others as our instruments (and I believe that it is), then we might also say that those who excel at violent behaviour know how to use their tools well, are good at chasing them down or careful to keep them handy when they need them. Further, we might say that those who promote violence study their victims (whether it is the bank robber, the serial murderer). It seems reasonable to suggest that those who are non-violent must draw closer to those with whom they wish to act non-violently; indeed, that they must study those they would wish to make the subjects of their non-violence.
So, if we wish to take non-violence seriously, although I do not think drawing closer to others is all that is required, nevertheless, I think it is best to cultivate an understanding of how our actions as individuals, as well as how they build the broader social relations or our societies harm those who are not just like us (and even those who are).
To be non-violent toward others, I would say, is at least to refrain from harming them unjustifiably, but that this also involves a drawing closer to them in both our thoughts and actions in order to cultivate a deeper understanding of what non-violence is in relation to them as other persons. This drawing closer reflects a kind of empathy.
Non-violence as a belonging withBut even if we agree that non-violence is a refraining from and a drawing closer, it is not immediately clear why these are intuitively appealing to me or how I understand them as adding up to something I describe as 'non-violence'. What does the intuitive impulse toward non-violence already assume about the world and about ourselves as agents within it? Following the stoics, I often describe my relationship with other animals (particularly those in my care) as a �belonging with.�
I say, for example, that Julius (one of the cats who lives with me) does not belong to me, he belongs with me. I know him and he knows me, but more important, he is a person who needs my care and for whom I have agreed to care. If he did not know me and were a complete stranger, he would still belong with me. I do not know many of my neighbors, and yet, we each make any number of decisions throughout the day to make one another's lives better (e.g, not blaring New Kids on the Block at 2am, making sure our smoke detectors work and so on).
And so, although I do not think merely thinking of others as belonging with us means all of our actions with respect to them are non-violent, I think perhaps that non-violence must involve some sense of belonging with in some way or another. Perhaps this may seem less clear than it ought.
Belonging with is an older idea, and although we often think of ourselves as belonging with others who are already close to us (friends, family, classmates, neighbors), the transformation of the world through modern information technology has had its effects on a traditional understanding of belonging with. Many of us in the West understand our relationship to others as a matter of individuals relating to individuals; that we are each discrete and separate, but I believe this to be problematic.
Whether or not we consider our inescapable relationship to others to be ontological in nature, certainly, the ecosystem makes this a matter of reality and not merely ideas. We cannot cut down a tree without dispossessing someone. To be non-violent, I would say, is to understand what this action means in grave detail, not simply as a set of words but as a knowledge of how this affects the world and the others who belong with us.
This is very far from the too-frequent projection of emotional needs hidden behind calls for justice for others; it involves cultivating a deeper sense that we belong with one another. The former calls us to use others as props in a personal theatre. But the latter draws us closer and causes us to refrain from harming others, even when it does not gratify us to do so. This belonging with is an acknowledgement of our togetherness in the world with others.
Returning to SimonSo, what does Simon the Sadist propose to us as a metaphor? As �violent�, Simon does three things: first, he refuses to 'refrain from' harming the dog. Second, he also refuses a 'drawing closer to' in the sense that the dog is not a subject with whom he feels any affinity, but rather an object he �keeps handy� so that he may use the dog for his own pleasure. Finally, he understands his relationship to the dog as a �belonging to� rather than a �belonging with�. S/he is a tool for his use.
But there are important questions that our focus on Simon as the villain leaves out: what is the dog's name? Let us call her Christine. What does Christine like to eat? What is Christine's favorite toy? Who were Christine's mother and father? It does not interest me as much to know who Simon is, or what he wants, as it would to know who Christine is and what it is she wants, what is good for her, and so on. Certainly, I have little desire to draw closer to Simon, but nevertheless, I do not feel as though I can say he does not belong with me.
As another animal, in some sense he does belong with me, but then, so does Christine. In fact, he is lucky in the sense that, in acknowledging what I owe Christine, I cannot avoid acknowledging what I also owe him for similar reasons. The dilemma that Simon poses is not a matter of regulating Simon's use of Christine; it is a matter of resolving a dispute between two persons to each of whom I owe something similar.
Posed with choosing between them, I have a greater emotional experience of owing something to Christine (even if I am not sure what it is I owe or why I owe it); indeed, I think if we are properly non-violent, we should all have that experience. But this also draws us to an understanding that the choice is not just between Simon or Christine, but between violence and non-violence as ideologies. Neither should we fail to speak in Christine's defense, nor can we use Simon as the instrument of our own emotional gratification.
In fact, looking at the length of human history, there is nothing novel in hating Simon; emotional retribution is as old as human history. Looking at contemporary social relations, as the constant of all oppression, there is nothing unique or transformative about violence; instead, the system relies on violence in order to sustain itself. To take non-violence seriously as an ideology is to understand this and to work toward a meaningfully different future by rejecting a continuous (and continuously violent) history for ourselves and for Christine. It is our solidarity that binds us to Christine, calls us to act radically and non-violently on her behalf rather than in respect to our own gratification.
Non-violence, veganism and animal solidarityAs Francione proposes, Simon is breaking a rule we almost all agree is wrong, but why do we have this rule? In my view, our belonging with others, our empathy toward and our limiting ourselves with respect to other animals do not constitute an ideology; the first is only a statement that describes the world. The second is an emotional state, and the last is only a behavior.
Instead, I would suggest that solidarity with other animals is the ideology that adds up our belonging with other animals as a kind of togetherness in the world, our drawing closer to help them when we can and our refraining from harming them in a way that makes sense to us. Indeed, solidarity seems to me to be the word that best describes our togetherness with other animals (including human beings) as we all try to live in the world. If our actions and words do not stem from a sincere sense of solidarity, then I do not think we are properly non-violent.
It is our sense of solidarity with Christine that makes it clearer to us that what Simon is doing is wrong: we understand that other animals belong with us, we wish to draw closer to them, and this turns us (no matter how minimally) in the direction of refraining from harming them. Many people already have this sense deep within them. The task of vegan education is to blow upon the embers of this solidarity.
I do not think that we can be fully non-violent without understanding ourselves to be in a relationship of solidarity with other animals. It is this solidarity that it is most important to cultivate in ourselves and others. A limit of the will, empathy, and an understanding that we are together with other animals are the parts of the sum of this solidarity, but the sum is also more than the parts.
From education to transformationPersonal change is not necessarily political change, although it seems to me that the latter is impossible without the former. Theory is the brush that helps us to paint a metaphor of 'the world' on the sky, but love is the fire that transforms it. The former we make; the latter makes us. So, when I propose that non-violence is a refraining from, a drawing closer to and a belonging with, I am at once proposing both a sketch of the world, a vision of its transformation, and finally, a set of tactics by which we might do more than merely imagine that transformation, we might realize it instead.
When we consider our relationship to all other sentient animals, when we really consider fully the contours of what non-violence poses to us, we know, if only intuitively, that non-violence presents us with, and calls us to, more than just a refraining from. It draws us to a transformation of social relations that is unrivalled in human history. My liberation is not their liberation (or vice versa). Our states of liberation from and our modes of resistance to Capital, Empire, Patriarchy and other regimes of power that oppress us all may be very different.
Nevertheless, our respective liberations are unmistakably bound up together. Veganism is a baseline and emancipation a milestone. Veganism is the least we do to act non-violently with respect to other animals, and once nonhuman animals are emancipated, the struggle toward justice does not end; it merely takes on new shape and possibility. For those would prefer a simpler explanation, I think this blog is an excellent example:
The importance of adoption; there are so many Christineshttp://www.abolitionistapproach.com/the-importance-of-adoption-there-are-so-many-christines/Abolitionist veganism proposes to us a basis for personal and broad political change, as well as a clear strategy and set of tactics to help other animals, the ecosystem on which we all depend, and ourselves. If you're not vegan, did you know that it has never been easier to go vegan? If you are not an abolitionist, you can learn more about the approach at
www.abolitionistapproach.com.