Food miles: meaningful enviro-activism or wacky nonsense? Wacky nonsense.

One of the hipper excuses not to go vegan these days is that veganism is somehow bad for the environment. Common sense tells us that this is wrong, but guess what? So does the science. Turns out, the 100-Mile diet, sometimes shorthanded as locavorism, is an unscientific fad.

What's all the fuss about? Forget, say the locavores, all those articles in the New Scientist that suggest that it takes an outrageous amount of resources (and a deeply confused sense of the justice that we owe nonhuman animals) to enslave nonhuman animals for completely unnecessary human consumption; eating locally grown animal products is better for the environment than veganism.

In an excellent and compelling paper that addresses the actual science behind global food production, Dr. Pierre Deroschers from the University of Toronto (Geography) analyzes the food miles proposal. He finds it lacking.

In his paper, �Yes, We Have No Bananas: A Critique of the �Food-Miles� Perspective�, Desroschers argues that

food miles are, at best, a marketing fad that frequently and severely distorts the environmental impacts of agricultural production. At worst, food miles constitute a dangerous distraction from the very real and serious issues that affect energy consumption, the environmental impact of modern food production, and the affordability of food.

Marketing? In agribusiness? Untruthful marketing? In agribusiness? News at 11!

Of course, those of us who can reason simply figured out a long time ago that a primarily plant-based diet was typically (although not absolutely) better for the environment than one rich in animal products. It�s also just common sense that not enslaving nonhuman animals is morally the right thing to do. I would be vegan even if it were bad for the environment, but it�s good to know that I can be a good environmentalist and a good vegan simultaneously.

What�s the big problem with food miles according to Deroschers?

The most problematic aspect of the food-miles perspective is that it ignores productivity differentials between geographical locations. In other words, activists assume that producing a given food item requires the same amount of inputs independently of where and how it is produced.

In short, it ignores the fact that about 80% of the energy that goes into food goes into the production of the food, not in transport. Moreover, it doesn�t account for the surplus of sunlight energy in certain locales.

Further, Deroschers argues,

82 percent of the estimated 30 billion food miles associated with UK consumed food are generated within the United Kingdom, with car transport from shop to home accounting for 48 percent and heavy goods vehicles (HGV) like tractor-trailers for 31 percent of food miles. Remarkably, air transport amounted to less than 1 percent of food miles.

Want to make a more serious impact in your food miles? Buy internationally grown fruits, roots, nuts and shoots, but take your bike to the market.

That doesn�t mean local food is necessarily bad for the environment, bad for consumers or bad for farmers. It just means that people who eat animal products because they were produced less than 100 miles away are not only morally derelict in terms of what they owe nonhuman animals, they're also very seriously fooling themselves into believing that they are doing something right for the environment. Instead, they're doing something that's definitely bad for nonhuman animals and potentially bad for the environment.

In short, you can be an environmentalist and a vegan. If you�re not vegan yet, you should take the rights of animals not be used as property seriously and go vegan today. If you're a vegan but not an environmentalist, you should consider seriously that animals (human and non) both need a sustainable ecosystem in which to have their lives. Abolishing the property status of nonhuman animals is the right thing to do, and it will eliminate animal agriculture as a key source of environmental harm. If you're not an abolitionist but what to learn more about the approach, read through my other articles of head over to www.abolitionistapproach.com.

Works Cited

Desrochers, Pierre and Hiroko Shimzu. "Yes We Have No Bananas: A Critique of the Food Miles Perspective." Mercatus Policy Series Policy Primer, No. 8. Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, October 2008.

The paper is also available electronically:
http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=24612

If you take speciesism seriously, why are you still imitating the oppressor? Ten things vegans can do to be less speciesist

There's been a lot of talk about Chipotle's new veg*n offering. I write veg*n because it's not clear that it will be properly vegan (that's if it comes into being). Erik Marcus has actually tweeted that: �If you're not excited, you might not have a pulse.� I'm not sure nonhuman animals will share his excitement. Baffling and rather speciesist. Also, great viral marketing on the part of Chipotle. It's disappointing when vegans bend over backwards to promote nonvegan businesses; I wish it were uncommon.

But let's pause and think for a moment about what there is to be excited about here. This may normalize plant-based alternatives in a way that helps agribusiness continue to profit, but it also further normalizes speciesism. I thought vegans were against that? I can to go a restaurant chain where the dead are dismembered, deep fried and served on a platter. I can eat my plant-based food that's been cooked a grill with splattered fats from the cooked flesh of the dead. And I can surround myself in the cosy atmosphere of people who believe that nonhuman animals should be our slaves.

We can all smile at one another across the table, our mouths full, knowing that our money is going to further slavery and knowing that someone in someone's marketing department is rubbing his or her hands together with glee. Let's imagine a similar scenario. Would MLK or Malcolm X go to a diner where African Americans were served (as the main course) to eat a plant-based alternative and go on about how exciting this was? Probably not (and by probably, I really mean definitely).

Well, I tried (no, not really). I'm still very underwhelmed about this. I have no doubt that nonvegans (and apparently many vegans for that matter) are deeply confused about what we owe nonhuman animals morally, but the idea that I would line the pockets of industry to enjoy my "plant-based but not properly vegan" crumbs from the master's table doesn't seem all that much to get worked up over. As an advocate, it's my job to reset that table. I'm not blaming anyone. Speciesism is difficult to understand, I've made plenty of mistakes myself, and I have not always been the best advocate that I could.

But if we take nonhuman animals seriously, the least we can do is go vegan, stay vegan, say vegan, and work to end their property status of nonhuman animals. And that's the least we can do. There's actually no penalty for doing more. It's not even a limited time offer. So, a blog on speciesism and some of the things we can do to take nonhuman animals more seriously as persons with rights, to help normalize anti-speciesism, and to stop gleefully kissing the ass of the oppressor at every turn.

A little tough love for vegans, but love nevertheless. I believe in you.

First, let's consider whether or not we have five minutes a day we can devote to animal advocacy, outreach and education. Veganism is wonderful. As Gary L. Francione often writes and says, it's the most important thing any of us can do. It is the unequivocal moral baseline of the animal rights movement, and it is the right thing to do. But it's not the only thing many of us can do. Educate. Teach. Cook. Speak. Write. Read. Blog. Perform a play. Make a video. Write a book. Become the outspoken, passionate, and most of all, educated, sincere and disciplined advocate that nonhuman animals need. If we take justice seriously, we can make five minutes a day that we can spare to advocate for the oppressed, can't we?

Second, let's stop talking about veganism as a matter of compassion, benevolence and other nice-sounding, but ultimately anthropocentric missives. The idea that we are 'being kind', 'acting compassionately', or 'saving lives' just by being vegan is misguided. It's also paternalistic. Veganism is a matter of justice, and it reflects the absolute minimum of justice that I owe other persons (human and non). That doesn't mean we're not compassionate people. It doesn't mean we can't act compassionately toward other animals (human or non). It just means that veganism is what we owe them. It's not an act of charity.

Third, let's all stop eating out at nonvegan restaurants when it's trivial for us to avoid doing so. The moral proposal that we should make agribusinesses and their outlet stores richer so that we can feel more normal as vegans is misguided. I'm not saying we shouldn't promote vegan alternatives. But we can't buy our way to social transformation. That doesn't mean our purchasing power is unimportant. Just the opposite: it's so important that we shouldn't be bending over backwards to line the pockets of industry. I'm not saying vegans should never, ever eat out at nonvegan restaurants under any circumstances. I'm saying that we should be cooking for ourselves, building strong communities, engaging in culinary activism of our own, and sending a strong message that the slavery of nonhuman animals is anything but normal. We should be building abolitionist vegan alternatives. Start a potluck. Make a dish for a neighbour (and let them know that it was made with love � for nonhuman animals). Have a dinner party that celebrates the fact the speciesism is fundamentally wrong and unjust.

Fourth, let's stop imitating and start innovating. There's a whole world of cultural knowledge, history and traditions waiting to be written and explored by vegans. Yet, most of us prefer to watch reruns of Everyone Loves Raymond, eating fake meat and potatoes. I'm not saying that's a terrible thing to do (I like potatoes). I'm pointing out that we're really only at the beginning of writing the history and traditions of our own unique cultural community. Let's re-imagine today the cooking, the fashion, the art, the sport and all of the other important cultural changes that will result from a social transformation that is unmatched in human history and will reshape our lives in even the smallest details.

Fifth, let's all stop fawning over pseudo-veg*n celebrities. I'm not going to write this one out at length. You can read Mylene Ouellet's recent blogs on the matter. Suffice it to say, celebrities rarely get veganism right. What that means is that when they misrepresent veganism, they misrepresent it on a massive scale. That doesn't really help nonhuman animals very much and when we get too starry eyed about it, we take our eyes off the prize.

Sixth, let's all stop normalizing violence and adventurism. Violence is the paradigm and tool of the oppressor. Violence reflects a poverty of philosophy, a lack of imagination, a poverty of will, and an ignorance of social justice history. When vegans (or even more misguided, vegetarians) propose violence as the basis of social change for nonhuman animals, they are proposing to stop a flood by peeing in the river. Let's also stop the adventurism. Maybe it's not directly violent, maybe it's not directly illegal, but let's stop this nonsense about TERRIFYING THE OPPRESSOR! When animal advocates engage in a hypermasculine posturing that would make professional wrestlers wince, they signal to the public that the movement is populated by childish caricatures (no offense to children), not diligent, thoughtful and sincere adults who want to see nonhuman animals get free.

Seventh, let's also stop the antics (and while we're at it, the sexism, classism, racism, heterosexism, sizeism, xenophobia and other expressions of irrational prejudice). Antic-based activism signals to the public that one of the worst enormities in human history is something to laugh at. It's definitively speciesist. Activism that attempts to capitalize on other social prejudices is also deeply morally problematic, insofar as it promotes irrational prejudices against human beings. Not only does it not help nonhuman animals, it turns animal advocacy into a politically reactionary movement.

Eighth, let's stop acting as if more speciesism, more violence and more death were a victory. I smile when people tell me they are taking the rights of animals seriously and going vegan. I may do a jig when the property status of nonhuman animals is finally abolished. But the idea that it is a major victory for a nonhuman animal to have anything other than to have his, her or zir (not all animals are male or female) life back free from use, to have the care s/h/ze needs if needed or a pond back, a forest back, a plain back, sunshine, a dark cave, cool water, warm water, fresh water, salt water -- whatever it is his, hers or zirs as a person to have � is a slap in the face to those who live in slavery.

Ninth, as a corollary, let's try to remember, it's not about whether or not we feel good; it's about whether or not they get free, or in the case of domesticated nonhumans who will not be able to fend for themselves, the care that they need. We can do a little more just by saying no to welfare advocacy, which achieves nothing meaningful for nonhuman animals, and even if it were ever to be successful, would still send the wrong message: that animals are ours to use, so long as we use them �humanely�, which is almost certainly very harmful to their interests.

Tenth, let's adopt a nonhuman animal, volunteer at a shelter or otherwise educate others about nonhumans as persons with rights. My veganism is not just about not using nonhuman animals. It's about understanding them as beings with whom I share my house, my neighbourhood, the city, and the ecosystem. Nonhuman animals are not just things that I don't eat, wear, experiment on, etc., anymore; they're persons to whom I owe moral consideration. If you can't adopt, volunteer, or donate to help nonhuman animals directly, read books about them so that you are an informed and articulate advocate who can at least educate others about animals as persons.

That's a short list. Creative, nonviolent, and mass vegan movement and the abolition of the property status of nonhuman animals are only the first and most important milestones in the fight against speciesism. The most important thing any of us can do is to go vegan, to adopt abolition, and educate others about the morally imperative that abolition and veganism impose upon us. But there's always more to do if you can. If you're not vegan yet, go vegan today. If you're not an abolitionist, feel free to read my other articles or head over to www.abolitionistapproach.com

Compassion or justice? Empathy and animal rights

Often in the animal advocacy movement, the problem of animal use is phrased as an absence of empathy or a lack of compassion. "If only people had more empathy! Veganism is a compassionate choice." What are we to make of these claims?

It is important to distinguish between empathy as a kind of emotional motivation that may or may not lead us to moral action, and moral action itself. It is the difference between the gasoline and the car, the driver, the driving, and the destination. Empathy can equally lead us into immorality if it is not properly considered. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between compassion, something we do as an act of benevolence, and justice, something we do because it is morally required of us to do it.

Many animal welfare advocates pose the moral problem as a need to understand the emotional world of another animal; often shorthanded as being "empathetic". None of us can do this properly, even if we might imagine that we can. That doesn't mean we cannot read body language or mood signals from other animals in some instances; it is simply to state the obvious that there would always be a certain amount of error involved.

Moreover, in my experience, many people relate to nonhuman animals (even their companion animals) in the same way that overbearing parents try to live vicariously through their children, mistaking their emotional echoes for the emotional lives of their companions. It is not clear that many people even get this far. Some instead treat all nonhumans (and just as often, other humans) with a complete moral apathy. This is not to say that more empathy would not be helpful in these situations. It might be. However, empathy flows often from our understanding of justice. That is, we are often empathetic to those to whom we already feel a sense of duty, even if we are not entirely certain about the nature of that duty.

Just understanding the emotional lives of nonhuman animals does not provide us with a proper basis to understand what we owe them in moral terms, as some animal welfare advocates have suggested it does. In a sense, this poses nonhuman animals as "things with feelings". But in fact, many nonhuman animals who would have a right not to be used as property may have little or no emotional lives at all.

This is, I think, different from comprehending animals as persons (some of whom have emotions, but all of whom would have some interests with respect the world) and trying to deepen our understanding of what we owe them in moral terms in light of that personhood. This is often (but not exclusively) an empirical process that informs and is informed by our rational decision making. If we wish to act most justly and most virtuously with respect to animals (human and non), some knowledge of their interests and a deepened understanding of them as persons to whom we owe moral consideration is required.

Let's say I told you a man died today in a traffic accident. You'd have some rational sense of what this meant. You might feel bad for him, feel bad for his family, etc. You might ask whether or not he suffered much.

But this would be remarkably different from an experience in which the man dies in your arms with his or her children standing nearby, the cars smashed and still smoking, broken glass all over the tar of the road, the sirens of ambulances and fire trucks, listening to his last breaths, watching his eyes flutter as he loses consciousness, his torso shaking, blue shirt, brown hair with streaks of grey, ashen skin, hazel eyes, all convulsing in your arms, seeing the looks of confusion and sadness on the faces of his children, one a girl who is just about to hit puberty with brown hair, freckles and a blue dress who will need braces and the other a boy in black jeans and a tan coat, and understanding as a whole (without fully thinking about it) the whole of the reality of the moment of his death and what it means in moral terms to all of those who will be affected by it.

In the first case, you're understanding rationally what's happened, but in the latter case, you comprehend cognitively in remarkably full and grave detail much more about the reality of that death in terms of what it meant to you and what it meant to the people involved: in short, what it meant in terms of moral reality.

If the man in my example had no children, he would still have an interest in continuing his life. If he were terrified or calm due to shock and hoping to see his dearly departed mother, he would still have an interest in continuing his life. If he could feel nothing emotionally at all, he would still have an interest in continuing his life. If he were a pig, he would still have an interest in continuing his life. If he were a bat, he would still have an interest in continuing his life. If he were a cuttlefish, he would still have an interest in continuing his life.

Although the precise nature of their interest in continuing their lives and their cognitive ability to comprehend and experience the world may vary, it does not follow from this that they have no interest in continuing their lives or that we are justified in harming them. His death would still be a loss, and insofar as we may be said to intentionally cause his death (or his harm, or to otherwise use him in a way to which he cannot consent), we would be doing something very gravely morally wrong. Moreover, we could not describe it legitimately as 'a compassionate choice' not to harm him but our duty in light of the justice that we owe him. It it not 'compassionate' to pay what we owe others; it is just.

Not using other animals as property (even if we don't cause them death in doing so) is obviously the most important thing we can do. Welfarist critics often describe the proposal to abolish the use of animals as an 'an abstract legal concept', and I always find this kind of baffling; in fact, it is critically important to understand nonhuman animals as persons with rights, who call us to limit our wills with respect to them, to not use them as property as the moral baseline of our lived daily practices.

Whatever the psychology, morality calls me to limit my personal will and desires in favor of doing what is right and avoiding what is wrong. Empathy and morality are not opposites, but neither are they mutually inclusive, nor can they be substituted. It is not because I am empathetic either to cockroaches or to Nazis that I don't intentionally harm either of them (although many of you can guess with whom I would rather share my bagel); it's because they both have a right not to be used as property because they are sentient.

We often think about nonhuman animals (and other humans) in ways that are remarkably vague, abstract and shallow. Rarely are their lives and deaths more than newspaper headlines or statistics. Even many vegans think of them as things with feelings that we try to accommodate as an act of our charity and goodness. We seldom comprehend them as persons to whom we owe an unequivocal duty, who have a unique place in the world, who want their lives, and that when any of them loses his or her life, that it's as morally meaningful as the death of a human being.

If we take the moral rights of nonhumans seriously (and we all should), we should internalize and act on a full understanding of the moral realities of what nonhuman animals face in slavery as an abridgment of their rights and denial of the justice we owe them. When we have cultivated properly this understanding of reality, only then can we be said to experience properly the visceral revulsion that attends to an encounter with speciesism that is immediate, sincere, and lucid.

This is different from a shallow, vague and rational understanding on reflection that it was a shame that raccoon was killed by a car, or an overly emotional cuddlitarian response that draws us into mistaking our own emotional desires to have a being continue his or her life with what s/he has lost in losing it and the tragedy that this proposes to us. Both of which are also different from the standard "so what?" that most people would experience.

It is not compassion that we need, but a strong sense of justice, an attention to our duties to others, and a habit of acting as virtuously as we can with respect to their rights. It is a sense of humility and not benevolence, a sense of justice, not charity. This begins with veganism. If you are not vegan already, you should go vegan today. If you are not an abolitionist, but wish to learn more about the approach, you should read my previous article or head over to www.abolitionistapproach.com

Veganism's not a hobby; it's a moral imperative

A couple of colleagues have written to me recently with questions about social events.  Is it wrong or impolite for a vegan to decline a social event where nonvegan food will be served or to make arrangements to arrive after the food has been served?  I wish these were uncommon questions, but a great many of the questions I field have to do with people simply navigating the social dynamics of being vegan.  In this blog, I'm going to answer the question first and then discuss why this question is so common.

Before I start, I want to draw your attention to recent pieces on veganism, one by Gary Francione, one by Elizabeth Collins and one by Myl�ne Ouellet.  All three provide some additional ideas on veganism and social relationships (some of which are perhaps slightly contrary to my own, but abolitionists often disagree on fine points).Like scientists, we are a community that agrees to common points and methods and processes of inquiry (sound reasoning, empirical evidence, reality, etc.) for understanding what we owe other animals (human and non), even if our results do not always match exactly.

There is nothing wrong with that. What is important is that we are self-correcting and self-critical as a community, not a religious cult based around any individual always being right all the time (unlike many other strands of the animal advocacy movement for which adherence to a cult of personality is a basic requirement). For an abolitionist, agreement on every tiny detail of everything is not required; however, (among other things) clear thinking, a willingness to accept reality, taking the Six Principles of the animal rights position seriously and a broader  commitment to doing what's right for nonhuman animals are.

Let's return to the question. First, let's clarify the question, which I think is two questions.  Is it ethically wrong to decline such an invite? Second, is it wrong in terms of etiquette to propose arriving after the food has been served? With the first, I think it's entirely a vegan's prerogative. It is unreasonable for anyone to expect anyone else to participate in any activity they consider to be patently unethical. If attending an event where animal foods will be served makes you ethically uncomfortable, you're usually within most normal understandings of social behaviour to decline, especially if it's a matter of entertainment (e.g., it's not like you're declining a bone marrow transplant or something).

With respect to the second, assuming that you haven't asked your hosts to go to a lot of unreasonable extra effort on your behalf (e.g., you'll only attend if your mashed potatoes are made with truffle oil), and you're not proposing something that would seriously mar the event (e.g., if you are a nudist and you wanted to attend au naturel), I still think it's entirely your prerogative to decline and that you have not done anything rude just by asking to arrive at a later time.

In terms of proposing an arrival after the start of the event, this can sometimes be tricky in terms of the etiquette.  There are, of course, times when hosts have appropriate reasons to ask all guests to arrive by a particular time. If the event on a boat and it has to leave by a particular time, that's probably understandable.  If it's an informal BBQ, however, where guests may drop in whenever they get off work, or whenever they can make it, the host is probably being unreasonable.  On the third hand, it's the host's event to be unreasonable about.

It's not uncommon to receive less than polite replies to these kinds of inquiries.  When we receive short-tempered replies about own concerns in these matters, it's usually that the host feels judged by the question. If that's the case, in my view, that's the host's issue. Having said that, we always have an opportunity to be virtuous and I think the virtuous thing to do in this case is to try understand why the host was offended, let the host know that you are still interested in attending (assuming you are), that you look forward to seeing him or her and the other guests, etc., and that you hope you can discuss whatever the problem is, that you didn't mean to cause any offense and that if the question caused any, it was was inadvertent. This is different from apologizing, but since you haven't done anything wrong, I don't think an apology is required here.

Because I believe that good deeds rarely go unpunished, vegans should probably expect any range of response: it may be a civil reply, or it may be earful about how elitist and judgemental we are just because we take nonhuman animals seriously. I can only say that in my experience, most people are very courteous about my veganism (although I live in Canada, a country renowned for its politeness). The short answer to this question is that it is not wrong and it is not rude, in and of itself, for a vegan to try to avoid social situations in which animal products will be served. 

But should vegans attend these kinds of events?  There is a probably a reasonable argument to be made that a vegan may decide to attend the event if there is sufficient justification for him or her to do so.  However, there is also a reasonable argument to be made that a vegan may decide not to attend the event on the basis that it tends to normalize speciesism. 

I am not making a proclamation or giving definitive moral guidance on this last part either way on this question.  I am only pointing out that the question of whether it is appropriate for a vegan to attend this kind of event is a matter of debate in the larger community; however, because something is a matter of debate, it does not follow that there is not a right answer.

What is most important, however, is to cultivate a habit of asking moral questions, trying to answer sincerely and rationally, and then to act accordingly.  So long as you act with humility, sincerity and good faith with respect to the rights of others, first and foremost, and in consideration of what is virtuous, second, you rarely act unethically or impolitely.

Having said that, we should always put ethics ahead of etiquette.  Anyone who fails to understand that ethics are more important than etiquette understands neither.

If you wish to act well, first, you should consider what your duties are, and fulfill those.  There is no clear duty in this case to attend such an event.  If one does attend, vegans still have a very clear duty not to eat any animal foods, no matter how much Aunt Martha pushes her bacon, steak and duck casserole on you. 

Second, however, once your duties are fulfilled (or in those situations where you can fulfill your duties in a number of ways, or if you do not have any specific duties), you may also consider what's the virtuous thing to do in a given situation.  How can I act best beyond my literal obligations to act well? This is also an important part of abolitionist veganism.  As an abolitionist vegan, it is not enough to fulfill a checklist of the absolute least we can do; we must also consider seriously the moral imperative that the rights of nonhuman animals impose upon us and act as well as we can in light of that imperative. 

That is, the question is not (or is not just): what is the absolute bare minimum I can do in this situation to meet veganism as a baseline? The question is: how can I act best in solidarity with those who live and die in slavery for the pleasure of others?  What is it that I owe them?  This question may, at times, be difficult to answer. It may call us to do what we perceive to be seriously difficult, and indeed, what may be objectively difficult.  It may vary by specific circumstance.  It may often lead us into making mistakes.  It may often make abolitionist veganism seem difficult to people who are not used to moral life.  Finally, it may also  yield more than one right answer. But we must cultivate a habit of asking the question and acting on its results.

This draws me to the second part of my blog.  Why don't nonvegans take veganism more seriously?  Why do we have to field this kind of question? First, speciesism is endemic and enveloping.  It is very difficult for people to understand the moral necessity of veganism.  But second, and more troubling, most vegans are busy telling them that veganism is not a moral imperative, but a personal choice.  This is very deeply misguided. Not only does it make more work for vegans who take veganism seriously, it confuses the public about what we owe nonhuman animals.

There is no meaningful way to promote veganism, educate about veganism, etc., except to do so. "Gateway" and "indirect" approaches propose and promote a lot of confusion. I agree with Francione, Collins and Oullet that veganism is very easy most of the time, but there may also be times when it is legitimately difficult. But veganism is not a hobby. It's not something we should or others should expect us to leave in the garage when we go to Acapulco or the neighbours; it's a moral imperative. It goes where we go, and veganism should inform our decisions when it is appropriate for it to do so. Moreover, what most people perceive as being difficult often is not, and more important, the idea that we should promote what is easy rather than what is correct is misguided.

Further, the proposal of some vegans that we shouldn't take difficult moral decisions for nonhuman animals as rights-holders when we are willing to do the same for human rights-holders is very troubling (and often speciesist).  Veganism is not a hobby.  There may be times when it is difficult and unenjoyable, but most of the time it is easy, fulfilling, but most of all, it is the right thing to do; it is the baseline of what we owe nonhuman animals.

But it all starts with you going vegan, staying vegan and saying vegan.  If you are not vegan yet, you should go vegan today.  If you are already vegan, but not an abolitionist, you can learn more about the approach at Gary Francione's Web site www.abolitionistapproach.com or by reading my other articles.

HSUS and other agribusinesses battle over Issue 2 in Ohio: Hitler and Mussolini battle over Europe

I know the title probably sounds incendiary, but relax, it's only a metaphor. The similarity is not that HSUS, other agribusinesses or the state of Ohio are dictatorial regimes bent on world domination and eugenics (although I'm not an insider to any and can't make any claims one way or another); it's that they are content to participate in a haggle over how best to kill nonhuman animals so that people can feel better about that killing without concerning themselves in the slightest over the rights of those they are violating in the process.

This blog is all about Issue 2 in Ohio, a law that proposes �a constitutional amendment to create the Ohio Livestock Care Standards Board.� HSUS is opposed. Their position? �Why is The Humane Society of the United States opposing Issue 2? While designed to give the appearance of helping farm animals, Issue 2 is little more than a power grab by Ohio�s agribusiness lobby.�

That sounds familiar. But let's look at what's being claimed here. There's no statement about the moral necessity of veganism. There's no statement about animal rights. There's not even a statement about promoting a reduction in the consumption of nonhuman animal products and labour. There's no statement about reduction even for human health or human environmental benefits. There isn't even a clear statement about nonhuman animal welfare or humane treatment. Just that industry shouldn't be left to regulate itself because it gives false appearances.

http://www.hsus.org/legislation_laws/ballot_initiatives/ohio_issue_2.html

HSUS claims that the �industry-dominated 'animal care' council proposed by Issue 2 is really intended to thwart meaningful improvements in how the millions of farm animals in Ohio are treated on large factory farms." Now, I won't speculate that HSUS is really involved in this campaign because it cares about driving publicity for its donor campaigns. I won't speculate that HSUS isn't really all that interested in the millions of farm animals in Ohio for their own sakes. I won't speculate that they're opposed to this law because they're not a part of the board.

But what should I infer from this? It's not clear how HSUS' participation on the board or their cooperation with agribusiness would do anything other than give appearances without doing much of anything for nonhuman animals. It's not clear that HSUS takes the lives of nonhuman animals very seriously, least of all, farm animals. It also sounds like a complaint about a lost business opportunity to sell indulgences to the public so that we all feel better about harming the nonhuman animals that we do. It's also worth pointing out that those choices are almost utterly trivial for any of us to avoid.

I will say that anyone who takes nonhuman animals seriously, including HSUS, should promote abolitionist veganism. I'll further point out that HSUS is a business, and so, is motivated by the same concern for profit that motivates all businesses. I don't necessarily disagree that industries shouldn't regulate themselves. But I do think HSUS, if it takes nonhuman animals seriously, should devote its entire budget to promoting an end to animal slavery not to trying to get a cut of the industry action.

Furthermore, no one should mistake HSUS for an animal rights group. Pacelle has agreed on Agritalk that it's not his or HSUS' intent to shut down the livestock industry. That he's opposed to the rights of animals. Pacelle further claims that �No one can reasonably claim that our work is moving in the direction of eliminating animal agriculture."

So, let's be clear. The objective of this campaign is not to lift animals out of slavery. It's not to change the status quo in meaningful ways for nonhuman animals in terms of their property status. It's not to promote veganism. It's not to promote the rights of animals. It is not even to lay the ground work for abolition, which is what some new welfare groups claim they're doing when they do the same work as HSUS is doing. It's not to educate the public about the serious moral need to change our relationship with nonhuman animals. If nonhuman animals live their whole lives in miserable slavery (because all slavery is miserable), that's fine with HSUS and apparently fine with Wayne Pacelle. This campaign is about not letting industry regulate itself to the exclusion of HSUS.

So, in my defense, you'll understand that it's difficult to come up with another appropriate metaphor with which to describe the moral problems here. For example, I could write that the �battle� between HSUS and other agribusiness �undermines� the status quo in the soda industry as much as a �battle� between Coke and Pepsi might over how much sugar to put in soda would. Or I could write that it �challenges� the status quo of the gaming industry as much as a battle between Sony and Nintendo haggling over a new game pad standard might.

Both of these metaphors point out, quite aptly, that HSUS and other agribusinesses are really in a battle over their respective business interests embodied in �humane� animal products. These metaphors make it clear that neither party is interested in abolishing the industry: indeed, they profit from its continuance and are economically dependent on it. But these metaphors leave out the fact that we're not talking about just sugar, soda, games or peripheral ports.

HSUS and the rest of the agribusiness community in Ohio seem to be haggling over how to best to snuff out the lives of living, breathing beings: cows, chickens, pigs, all kinds of nonhuman animals who have an interest in continuing their lives, in being free from suffering, and being free from exploitation, who have a right not to be used in the first place. That's not really a battle between meaningfully different ideologies that propose meaningful social transformation for the oppressed: it's a battle between two rivals who share a dominant and oppressive ideology about who gets to take the credit and makes the big decisions.

It's unfortunate that people who seem to take the lives of at lest some dogs and cats very seriously are so willing o apply a different kind of reasoning to other nonhuman animals who share a common desire to be free. Moreover, this obviously confuses the public about what we owe nonhuman animals, which is not better treatment but rather not to use them unjustifiably at all.

But if you take nonhuman animals seriously, in any way, the most important thing you can do today is to take their rights not to be used as property seriously and go vegan. If you want to see their slavery abolished, then you should consider adopting the abolitionist approach. If you want to learn more about the latter, read through my previous articles or head over to Gary L. Francione's Web site: www.abolitionistapproach.com.

But what about cuttlefish? The question no one ever asks me but someone really should

No one ever asks me: what about cuttlefish? I hesitate to link to Wikipedia, but most of the accessible Internet material on cuttlefish are about cuttlefish as food. Maybe if I lived in Italy I would hear this question more often.

For those who don't know, cuttlefish are an invertebrate sea animal, a type of cephalopod (cuttlefish are actually 120 or so separate species). Like some other cephalopods, they have a remarkably complex but partly distributed nervous system and 'brain'. I put brain in quotes because their brains are somewhat different from mammalian brains. Their ganglia are spread out around their bodies, making their brains a bit more spread out, rather than more centralized as it tends to be in mammals.

In the interests of full disclosure, I'm not an ethologist, biologist or zoologist.  So, it's very possible that I will get some of the word choice and details that I use in this essay wrong.  However, I do read a fair amount of cognitive ethology reading because I am interested in nonhuman animals, and understanding a nonhuman animal both as an individual and as a species in some detail helps us to understand how to act morally with respect to them.

I do believe that we may owe many invertebrate species at least some moral consideration. It's possible that not all invertebrates share all of the same interests that other nonhuman animals (whether vertebrate or invertebrate) do. In fact, the vertebrate/invertebrate distinction may not be all that meaningful to our moral conception of nonhuman animals. What really matters is sentience. The vertebrate/invertebrate divide may help us make generalized statements about who is sentient and what is not, that seems to be less and less the case.

As one invertebrate among millions and millions of invertebrate species, cuttlefish, however, are remarkable. They change colours to hide from predators similar to a way a chameleon does. They deceive both their predators and their prey. They form relationships. They play. They learn. They have brains. In short, they evince many of the behaviours of more complicated mammals. Yet, even among those who take mammalian sentience as mostly given, there's debate about cuttlefish and other invertebrates because their skeleton is on the outside rather than on the inside, their brains are more distributed than centralized and because it is not clear whether or not they experience pain the way mammals do. The question this blog answers is, what moral difference does this make?

I've never been asked a moral question about cuttlefish, but I am asked, fairly often, about insects (another type of invertebrate); in particular, whether or not we owe them some moral consideration.  But when I'm asked about insects, I normally respond by asking "Which insect?" And if we're going to talk about insects, why not talk about all invertebrate animal species?

Most invertebrates share a roughly similar ganglionic nervous system; all share an exoskeleton ('bones' on the outside rather than on the inside). To use an unscientific metaphor, where our brains are more like a personal computer (centralized), theirs are more like a network (spread out). But we cannot assume from this that it makes their cognition less efficient, or that they do not cognize the world at all. In fact, if we take science seriously, then we should be careful to infer too much about what may happen or not happen in their minds (if they can be said to have them) and how they observe and respond to the world (if they can be said to do so).

But it seems reasonable to at least pose the question: why does an animal species have sense organs and and a 'brain' if they don't have minds and a unique perspective and a set of interests?  And if an animal has a perspective, and interests in light of that perspective, what are our moral duties?

Part of the problem today with our understanding of sentience is that our understanding of it is based on an observable response to painful stimuli in a laboratory. There are a lot of different understandings of what makes a being sentient, but this is one of the most common. It precludes, of course, my ABS breaks and my thermostat from being said to be sentient. However, it may also preclude a great number of nonhuman animals just because their brains and nervous systems are wired slightly differently from mine.

The IASP defines pain as �An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage.�Historically, if an animal is poked enough that it seems to register a pain response, only then do we start to figure some amount of cognitive processing may be happening. If there is some cognition happening, then an animal is probably sentient.

If an animal is sentient, then, as a matter of moral philosophy, they may have interests. If an animal has interests, then they may have moral rights. If a nonhuman animal does has moral rights. In short the abolitionist vegan position argues that all animals insofar as they are sentient have an interest in continuing their lives, not experiencing pain, etc., and so they have a moral right not to be used as property and should have a legal right not to be used as property.  We take the moral baseline of not using nonhuman animals to be veganism.

The moral meaningfulness of pain response, however, in some respects, goes back to Descartes' argument about whether or not animals feel pain and how this shapes our moral views in light of them. Descartes argues that they cannot, and so, we do not owe any nonhuman animals any moral duties. In many respects, pain response has shaped scientific and philosophical understandings of sentience since. Of course, it is worth pointing out that in the public mind (and certainly philosophy), as Gary L. Francione has argued, that Descartes is a minority in his views that nonhumans could not feel pain.

Both Hume and Voltaire (among others), for example, express their fair share of acrimony toward Cartesianism for this reason. It reflects a divide in the history of natural philosophy (the fore-runner to science among other disciplines). Descartes and Cartesians generally reflect a tendency toward knowing truth through rationalism. They propose that we can deduce and know things about reality and our moral response to it by reasoning carefully about it. Hume, as another example, reflects a tendency towards empiricism (looking at reality and trying to reason about what is true with respect to reality inductively). These aren't necessarily mutually exclusive, of course, but they do reflect differing tendencies towards understand "the truth".

Both empiricism and rationalism have been taken with a larger grain of salt over the twentieth century. In a society in which the level of science has problematized simple observation (e.g., how are we going to simply observe quantum mechanics?), empiricism has been qualified. Relying on falsifiability the way we do, how do we make scientific sense of Descartes claim that �I think therefore, I am�? How could we design an experiment that shows some reasonable truths to be false and therefore, scientific? In a scientifically advanced society that divides questions we can disprove and questions we cannot disprove as nonscience and science, rationalism has also been qualified.

In short, as ethical agents who take careful reasoning and science seriously as formative to our moral views, we need both rational and empirical methods of unconcealing the world, in order to get us to a more accurate picture of reality, in order to act morally in light of it. And whether or not scientists can observe a pain response in an animal species has been one of those methods.

Pain response proposes us with a moral problem, of course. It is wrong to poke and prod (and do much, much worse) to nonhuman animals just to study them. However, it also poses us with a scientific problem. What if nonhuman animals are sentient in ways that do no involve pain response? I podcasted a bit about this recently, but what other criteria might we consider sufficient to believe that a nonhuman animal is sentient?

For example, we might take the view that an example of an emotional life is sufficient. Most mammals have emotions. We might take the view that having a brain is sufficient. Most nonhumans classed as animals have brains. We might take a central nervous system as sufficient, but most nonhuman animals don't have a CNS in the way that I do. Invertebrates, for example, have a different type of nervous system, and as consequence, it's not immediately clear that they experience the world in the same way that I might, but it seems clear that they do experience and respond to the world.

We might take the view that having a perspective (that is, having any of the biology required to observe and respond to the world uniquely) is sufficient. This would regroup a lot of the nonhuman animals we know and don't know sentient into the 'possibly/probably sentient' category from the 'nonsentient' category. It would also move us away from understanding sentience only in terms that preclude summarily the vast majority of nonhuman animals in the world: invertebrates.

Invertebrates include a wide variety of animals, including mollusks (e.g., cuttlefish and octopi), insects proper (bees and ants), crustaceans (e.g., lobsters and shrimp), as well as arachnids (e.g., spiders, mites., etc). Arthropods, what most people of think of as �insects� popularly but include crustaceans, insects and arachnids, for example, make up about 6 � 9 million species. That's about 90% (give or take) of the animal species in the world. The vast majority have not bee studied in any great detail. Many have not even been catalogued. And yet, many of us feel comfortable making sweeping moral judgments about whether we owe them moral consideration from a position of scientific ignorance about them.

In fact, the variety of invertebrate animals is remarkable, ranging from relatively large crustaceans like lobsters to the to tiny mites. Some of them produce opioids and and have opioid receptors (the chemical mechanisms that ease pain in mammals) and some of them do not. Some invertebrates build vastly complicated social organizations (e.g., ants and bees), and some of them are more solitary (e.g., octopuses). Some are enormous and remarkably biologically complicated animals (e.g., octopuses and squids) and some are small and less complicated (e.g., claims), while some are even smaller and still complicated (e.g., bees). Some of them have very remarkably complex nervous systems (like the cuttlefish), some of them (like clams) have very simple two-ganglia arrangements.

But the long and short of it is: there's still a simply amazing amount we still don't know about the vast majority of the nonhuman animals that populate the world, especially invertebrates. We do not all of the species that are sentient. But what is important from an abolitionist vegan perspective is that sentience is the morally meaningful criterion to determine whether or not we owe a being moral consideration of his/her/zir interests. As a general matter, it is morally most cautious not to intentionally harm any nonhuman animal, lest we intentionally harm someone who is sentient.

I agree that it's difficult to determine whether all invertebrates species classed as animals are sentient. Identifying and observing up to 9 million species in the wild to come to some full understanding of whether or not they understand and act on the world will be time consuming and difficult work. Most of us would agree that most of the nonhuman animals we use for food, clothing and entertainment are sentient, and that our unjustifiable use of them is wrong if we sat down and really thought about it clearly.

There is also a body of growing cognitive ethological work that suggests increasingly that, although many invertebrates may not emotional lives, some do, and while not every single species classified as an animal today is sentient, the majority of invertebrates we know probably are. If they are sentient, then we also owe these nonhuman animals moral consideration. If they might be sentient, however, and if it is trivial to avoid harming them, as it almost always is, then why not do so?

Of course, the simplest and most effective way to ensure that we are not harming other animals (human and non) unjustifiably is to take the rights of nonhuman animals seriously and go vegan. If you're not vegan already, you should go vegan today. If you are not an abolitionist, but want to learn more about the approach, feel free to read some of my other articles or head over to www.abolitionistapproach.com and do some reading.

Why I disagree with PeTA: There's really only one reason

Two interesting critiques of PeTA have been published back to back, one by Veganacious (yesterday, 1 October), and another by Katie Drummond (today, 2 October). Both are bloggers. Both are former members of PeTA. In the interests of full disclosure, I have never been a member of PeTA. I like a good critique, though, and I don't want to be left out.


It is difficult to capture Veganacious' critiue in a point-form outline. I suggest anyone read the piece for him or herself in full. In short, however, Veganacious writes that PeTA "have made so many missteps that I cannot consider them a positive force in the fight for the liberation of animals." I do not disagree. In particular, she criticizes PeTA for the following:

1. You use tacky tactics.
2. You are dishonest.
3. You support some of the most egregious companies
4. You partner with companies who show no conscience.
5. You have a scary attitude towards rescue that ends in death.
6. Your kill ratios are getting higher each year.
7. You refuse challenges.
8. You have become a destructive force.

I am not sure I understand all of these points in detail, but I think I agree with all of the above.

Again, my caveat about point form outlines applies. I suggest anyone read Drummond's piece for him or herself in full. In short, however, of PeTA, Drummond writes that "You are extreme � yes. Sadly for you, and even more sad for the human and non-human animals you get your hands on, that�s not a good thing. Here are five reasons for my loathing, though I�m sure there are many, many more." In particular, she criticizes PeTA for the following:

1. Your sensationalism is sexist, tacky and counterproductive.
2. Freezers filled with dead animals kinda negates the idea of animal advocacy.
3. Owning stocks in Dominoes Pizza is a problem.
4. You�re in bed with KFC.
5. You equate veganism with sexiness. And sexiness with weight loss.

I am not sure I understand all of these points in detail, but again, I think I agree with the spirit of most of them, even if I'm not sure about the clarity of the claim that "freezers filled with dead animals kinda negates the idea of animal advocacy." According to Newsweek, however, PeTA has killed more than 17,000 nonhuman animals since 1998.

However, as an abolitionist, my disagreement with PeTA is not a personal expression of my like or dislike. It is also not a matter of their tactics. It is more fundamental. Why do I disagree with PeTA?

1. As an animal advocacy organization, PeTA believes in, proposes, promotes, acts on and, indeed, trades on an ideology that is inimical to abolitionist veganism and violates the rights of animals (both human and non).

That's my chief disagreement: I object to their objectives (regulating animal use), their strategies (welfare reforms) and their tactics (antic-based activism, confusing messages, promoting nonhuman animal use as morally acceptable, killing adoptable nonhuman animals, etc.) -- in short, the works. There are several important corollaries. For example, they do not embody in their positions and work the Six Principles of the Animal Rights Position:

1. The abolitionist approach to animal rights maintains that all sentient beings, humans or nonhumans, have one right: the basic right not to be treated as the property of others.

If they believed this, they certainly wouldn't promote animal use they way that they do. Nor do they embody in their positions and work the view that:

2. Our recognition of the one basic right means that we must abolish, and not merely regulate, institutionalized animal exploitation�because it assumes that animals are the property of humans.

If they believed this, they certainly wouldn't promote reforms that regulate the use of nonhuman animals rather than the abolition of animal use. Nor do they embody in their positions and work and the view that:

3. Just as we reject racism, sexism, ageism, and heterosexism, we reject speciesism. The species of a sentient being is no more reason to deny the protection of this basic right than race, sex, age, or sexual orientation is a reason to deny membership in the human moral community to other humans.

If this were important, their campaigns and other work would not involve the frequently speciesist antics and problems that that they do (particularly the killing of adoptable companion animals). Nor do they embody in their positions and work and the view that:

4. We recognize that we will not abolish overnight the property status of nonhumans, but we will support only those campaigns and positions that explicitly promote the abolitionist agenda. We will not support positions that call for supposedly �improved� regulation of animal exploitation. We reject any campaign that promotes sexism, racism, heterosexism or other forms of discrimination against humans.

If this were important, their campaigns would not involve the frequently sexist, racist, sizeist, etc., antics and problems that that they do. Nor do they embody in their positions and work and the view that:

5. We recognize that the most important step that any of us can take toward abolition is to adopt the vegan lifestyle and to educate others about veganism. Veganism is the principle of abolition applied to one�s personal life and the consumption of any meat, fowl, fish, or dairy product, or the wearing or use of animal products, is inconsistent with the abolitionist perspective.

If this were important, they would trouble themselves to promote abolitionist veganism exclusively rather than veg*nism infrequently and ambiguously.  Finally, it is not clear to me that they embody in their positions and their work the view that:

6. We recognize the principle of nonviolence as the guiding principle of the animal rights movement. Violence is the problem; it is not any part of the solution.

Assuming that we agree that killing nonhuman animals unjustifiably is violent I would hope so!), PeTA definitely doesn't qualify as a nonviolent organization. Assuming that racism, sexism and speciesism are a type of violence, then PeTA fails further to meet this criterion even with respect to human animals.

To be clear, I don't hate PeTA. I disagree strongly with their positions and their work. I believe their objectives, their strategies and their tactics are inimical to mine as an abolitionist vegan. Having said that, I don't want to leave anyone, even inadvertantly, with the impression that simply criticizing PeTA is enough to be an abolitionist.  It is important to understand and work according to the Six Principles and, if we criticize, to criticize any organization regardless of how they self-identify insofar as they fail to live up to the Six Principles.

However, I do  want the organization's members, its supporters, the greater animal advocacy movement and the public to understand what PeTA is really doing wrong from an abolitionist perspective, and that's their consistent failure to understand, take seriously and act according to the Six Principles of the Animal Rights Position and all of the myriad ways they consistently violate the rights of both human and nonhuman animals while encouraging others to do the same.That's not very helpful to animals.

If you are not vegan now, and you want to be helpful to animals, today's a good day to take the rights of animals seriously, to go vegan, and to work toward abolition, and that includes PeTA.  If anyone at PeTA has questions, they should ask Ingrid Newkirk to agree to debate Gary L. Francione.  I'm sure he can explain it better than I can.

Podcast #5: The Animal Welfare Objective: Anything But Veganism

In this podcast, I discuss welfarism as an objective that is inimical to abolition as an objective, and why abolitionists take the rights of nonhuman animals and veganism as a moral baseline seriously because nonhuman animals are sentient, because they have interests, because, in light of those interests, they have moral rights, and in light of their moral rights, they should have the legal right not to be used as property.

http://www.animalssale.com
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